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ABSTRACT 
ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF SELF,  
NATION AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY  
 
Ebru Gözaçan Özşahin 
 
Cultural Studies, MA Thesis, 2011 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ayşe Gül Altınay 
 
Keywords: elite, education, educated ignorance, secularism, Ataturkism, nationalism. 
 
Based on in-depth interviews with elites who have graduated from two different elite 
schools, this study examines how Turkish elites socially, culturally and politically 
position themselves in contemporary Turkey. The narratives of the elites are 
historicized and contextualized in order to explore the relationship between elite 
education and emerging nationalism(s) in contemporary Turkey. This study argues that 
elite educational institutions are the most important agencies in the reproduction of the 
elite. The results of the research indicate that Turkish elites practice willful ignorance 
regarding the major political issues of contemporary Turkey. This study problematizes 
willful and educated ignorance and approaches the non-knowledge of the elites from an 
epistemological point of view and conceptualizes it within the networks of power 
relations. This study focuses on one of the challenges Turkish elites struggle with; the 
conflict between secularism and Islamism. Analyzing the feelings elites associate with 
the present day status of secularism in Turkey, this study aims to explore elite 
discourses of danger that construe Islamism and Islamists as the major threat to the 
Republican value of secularism. I argue that the construction of the secular elite identity 
is both inspired and supported by Ataturkist nationalism and try to show the clash of 
secular and Islamist identities through the prism of the headscarf debate in 
contemporary Turkey. 
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ÖZET 
 
GÜNÜMÜZ TÜRKİYE‘SİNDE ELİTLERİN BENLİK,  
ULUS VE TOPLUM ALGILARI 
 
Ebru Gözaçan Özşahin 
 
Kültürel Çalısmalar, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2011 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayse Gül Altınay 
 
Anahtar sözcükler: elit, eğitim, tahsilli cehalet, sekülarizm, Atatürkçülük, milliyetçilik. 
 
Derinlemesine mülakatlara dayanan bu çalışma, günümüz Türkiye‘sinde elitlerin 
kendilerini sosyal, kültürel ve politik olarak nasıl konumlandırdıklarını araştırmayı 
amaçlıyor. Günümüz Türkiye‘sinde ortaya çıkmakta olan milliyetçilik(ler) ve elit eğitim 
kurumları arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamak için elitlerin anlatıları tarihsellik içinde 
irdelenerek kavramsallıştırılıyor. Bu araştırma elit okulların elitlerin yetişmesinde en 
önemli organlardan biri olduğunu savunuyor. Araştırma sonuçları elitlerin Türkiye‘nin 
en belirgin politik meselelerine dair istemli bir bilmeme hali içinde olduklarını 
gösteriyor. Bilgi yoksunluğunun (tahsilli cehaletin) epistemolojisini yapmaya çalışan bu 
araştırma elitlerde gözlemlediğim bilmeme hallerini sorunsallaştırıyor ve istemli 
cehaletin aktif bir üretim olduğunu ve iktidar ilişkileri içinde kavramsallaştırılması 
gerektiğini savunuyor. Bu çalışma Türk elitleri için bir mücadele alanı olan sekülarizm 
ve Islamcılık çatışmasına odaklanıyor. Elitlerin, Türkiye‘de sekülerizmin bügünkü 
durumuna dair duygularını analiz ederek, İslam ve ve İslamcıları bir cumhuriyet değeri 
olan sekülerizme karşı en önemli tehdit olarak kurgulayan tehlike söylemlerini 
inceliyor. Seküler elit kimliğinin Atatürkçü milliyetçilik tarafından beslendiği ve ilham 
aldığını savunan bu tez, seküler ve İslamcı kimliklerin çatışmasını günümüz 
Türkiye‘sinde yaşanmakta olan başörtüsü meselesi üzerinden irdeliyor.      
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
June 2008, Graduation Ceremony, Robert College, Istanbul 
The guest speaker Betül Mardin who is a graduate of Robert College addresses the 
audience:  
 
“It was during the beginning of my first year at College...The tramway to Arnavutköy 
slowed down in front of Dolmabahçe Palace and the ticket collector rushed towards the 
gigantic door, stood there for a few moments and when he returned, he loudly said „Our Ata has 
slept well last night and this morning he has almost no fever.‟ Everybody applauded him. This 
went on every day...There were different ticket collectors but the routine was the same. Then a 
few weeks later, he returned and said with tears running down his cheeks “He is not well at 
all.” In fact, soon after when we came to school, we received the bad news: We had lost him. 
I always thought of him as a “father”. I would say “nothing bad can happen, he is there 
with us” or if something bad really happened then I would say “He‟ll pull us out of it...He‟ll 
know what to do”. These were good feelings…Now I would like to ask you to do such wonderful 
things for our country that you are thought of as a „father‟ or „mother‟. In fact, don‟t forget that 
he has given the responsibility of the country to you…the young generation is to take care of the 
Republic of Turkey… 
And now, most important…Let us repeat this sentence together…with Atatürk: 
So happy to be a Turk… (Ne mutlu Türküm diyene…) 
(Atatürk‟s voice…)”1 
 
At the end of her speech, Betül Mardin, filled with euphoria, leads the audience 
to sing the tenth anniversary march (Onuncu Yıl Marşı)2 which has become one of the 
most significant indicators of the revelation of the Ataturkist identity. Mardin creates an 
Andersonian homogeneous empty time
3
 of the Turkish nation by playing the voice of 
                                                          
1
 This speech was delivered in Turkish. The translation into English and the notes in brackets belong to 
Betül Mardin. 
2
 The tenth anniversary march which was composed in the tenth year of the Republic has later become a 
Republican symbol that has a nostalgic character and is used to silence the oppositional views and 
publicize the Republican ideology. 
3
 Benedict Anderson developed the idea of "homogeneous, empty time," in which "a sociological 
organism moving calendrically through [it] is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is 
conceived as a solid community moving steadily through history". Two events happening simultaneously, 
though in separate places, can link the people involved in those events by this precise "simultaneity;" that 
is, they share a consciousness of a shared temporal dimension in which they co-exist (1983 [2006]). 
 
2 
 
Atatürk delivering his historical speech on the tenth anniversary of the Republic and 
connects the audience to the glorious past of the Turkish nation the personifier of which 
is Atatürk. In order to restore the belief in nationalism and consequently evoke a 
nationalist sentiment, Mardin uses the image of Atatürk. She imposes a kind of 
nostalgia for the ‗father‘ the Turkish nation has lost, a father who is capable of 
overcoming all difficulties, a leader who knows what to do in all circumstances and a 
progenitor who will eventually lead us to the ‗truth‘. Since the death of the father, 
Turkish nation is orphaned; unable to replace the lost father. Mardin not only reminds 
the new graduates of Robert College how indebted they should be to their father but 
also induces them to be aware of their most important duty: to protect the Republic of 
Turkey. Hence, Mardin defines these young people through their duties to the state 
rather than their rights.   Mardin‘s imagination of Robert College graduates is more than 
this: she believes that the most prestigious Robert College graduates are the best 
candidates to be the future fathers and mothers of the Turkish nation. Mirroring 
conceptualizations of Turkish modernization as a top down project carried out by the 
modernizing elites in the foundational years of the Republic (Mardin 1962), Betül 
Mardin imagines Robert College graduates in positions of power within society as 
contemporary elites who will advance the modernity project, recreate and reproduce the 
homology of the Turkish nation.   
Almost 130 years ago, another nation was imagined and inspired by Robert 
College graduates. In the initial years of the college most of the students were 
Bulgarian. The class of 1869 had six graduates all of whom were Bulgarian, the 
graduates of the class of 1871 numbered five and were also Bulgarian. All these 
graduates, followed by other ones, have become Bulgarian elites, and had an immense 
effect on the independence campaigns against the Ottoman Empire and the nation 
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building of Bulgaria.
4
 The class of 1871, for example, furnished Bulgaria with two 
mayors, three ambassadors, four members of the national assembly, and three cabinet 
members two of whom became prime ministers of Bulgaria
5
 (Monroe 1914). In short, 
the most prominent Bulgarian nationalists were educated in Robert College at the end of 
the nineteenth century.       
In those times, Like Robert College, Üsküdar American Academy, has drawn its 
students from the numerous nationalities of the near east, and like Robert College, 
Bulgaria has been most largely represented in its student body, and the Bulgarian 
graduates have exerted the largest measure of influence. About twenty-six per cent of 
the total number of alumnae have been Bulgars; and many other Bulgarian women have 
pursued courses in the college and taken the course in the secondary school. All these 
women have exerted a strong influence among their people. The Bulgarian women who 
have studied at this Girls‘ College have rendered most efficient social service in their 
country, as teachers, nurses, and social workers. Many of them have married prominent 
statesmen and publicists. Üsküdar American Academy, in the beginning of the 1900s 
has been well characterized by Bulgarians as  ―the institution that trains the mothers of 
our statesmen and leaders‖ (Monroe 1914, 336). 
                                                          
4
 Scholars who explored nationalism and the related phenomena argue that elites played a crucial role in 
the formation of nations (Hobsbawn 1990; Hroch 1996; Smith 1983 [1971], Nairn 1996 [1972], Anderson 
1983 [2006]). Elites‘ role in the process of national movements is due to the influence of ideas and elites‘ 
capacity to promulgate these ideas. In Gramsci‘s terms, these people belong to the intellectual category of 
the ruling class and have a function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the ruling class (1989 
[1971]). Hence, elites, and especially urban intellectuals, are nationalistic well before the rest of the 
territory‘s population (Hobsbawn 1990) and responsible for the production and diffusion of the ideas 
concerning the nation. Similarly, Anthony Smith remarks that ―the intelligentsia do, indeed, play a 
definitive part in the rise of nationalist movements- everywhere‖ (1983 [1971], 83).  
5
 Robert College educated three prime ministers of Bulgaria: Konstantin Stoilov (1853-1901), Todor 
Ivanchov (1858-1906) and Ivan Evstraitev Geshow (1849-1924) studied at Robert College along with 
other Bulgarian intellectuals who have served Bulgaria in various ways.  
4 
 
The role that Robert College and Üsküdar American Academy has played in the 
nation-building process of Bulgaria had been closely observed by the Ottoman 
statesmen. By schooling, supporting and promoting the most prominent Balkan 
nationalists, these institutions had thrust themselves into a subversive role in Turkish 
politics. In so doing, they had turned their back on the possibility of extending their 
influence into Turkish society for a long time. They had revealed themselves as purely 
Christian institutions, speaking in the name of Christian minorities in the empire and, if 
necessary, an active intriguer in their behalf (Greenwood 2000).  
The director of Robert College George Washburn (1877-1903) and Professor 
Albert Long (1872-1901) were on the Ottoman government‘s list of political agitators. 
The government could have closed down the college and deport all the professors but 
the long dreaded Russo-Turkish war about to break and the Ottoman government was in 
desperate peril and decided not to take any action against Robert College (Greenwood 
2000). The college survived. It had lost whatever opportunity it might possibly have to 
serve Turkey in the last quarter of the nineteenth century as the great internal pressures 
of reform were to lead ultimately to the collapse of the Ottoman government. No 
Turkish student was to enter Robert College until near the end of the century and it had 
no practical influence on westernization movements of the Ottoman Empire. Both 
Robert College and Üsküdar American Academy for Girls, in those days, were regarded 
as ―traitor‖ institutions and had an unpleasant reputation within Turkish society.  
Times have changed. Today, these institutions are perceived to be the most 
selective schools which educate the Turkish elites whom have the highest prestige in 
various fields of social, cultural and political life within Turkey and in the world. The 
latest and the most contested one of these elites is Orhan Pamuk who is the 2006 Nobel 
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Laureate in Literature. Pamuk is a Robert College graduate and one of the most 
prominent novelists of Turkey. His works have been translated to more than 50 
languages around the world and he is the one and only Turkish citizen to be awarded 
with a Nobel Prize. Many Turkish people believe that his being awarded the Nobel 
Prize was politically motivated. New scenarios were constructed to dishonor both the 
Nobel Prizes and the Turkish Nobel Laureate by the Turkish mainstream media, various 
politicians and intellectuals. The scenarios resulted from the remarks that Pamuk made 
during an interview in February 2005 with the Swiss publication Das Magazin. In the 
interview, Pamuk said that ―thirty thousand Kurds have been killed in Turkey and a 
million Armenians‖. Turkish nationalists -furious with anger- started a hate campaign 
against Pamuk who was retroactively charged with ―insulting Turkishness‖. In 2006, the 
charges had dropped because of the international pressure put on Turkey regarding the 
issue of freedom of speech but the hate campaign forced Pamuk to flee his country.       
Turkey could not embrace her only Nobel Laureate. Most of the Turkish people 
reinvented one of their best novelists as a ―traitor‖ because of the politically loaded 
speech Pamuk made, and the Nobel prizes as ―unworthy‖ and ―dishonorable‖ awards 
which are ―highly politicized‖. Three of my professors who are graduates of either 
Robert College or Üsküdar American Academy have shared with me that the internal e-
mails among graduates of these two colleges contributed to the hate campaign against 
Orhan Pamuk. Some of the graduates believed that Orhan Pamuk‘s Nobel Prize was 
politically motivated and Turkey‘s ―outsider enemies‖ (read Western countries) had 
orchestrated another game in order to ―humiliate‖ Turkey and Orhan Pamuk had been a 
part of this game by the speech he made, and had ―guaranteed‖ to win the Nobel Prize. 
My professors‘ accounts of the contents and contexts of these e-mails suggest that the 
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majority of these graduates adopted a purely nationalistic and narrow approach to the 
issues of both Orhan Pamuk and Nobel Prizes. The professors have signed out of these 
e-mail groups. The discussion and the hate campaign still continue. Orhan Pamuk is still 
not on the honor list of the ―firsts‖ of Robert College‘s web page (see page 11). I have 
learned that the literature teachers of both colleges are reluctant to include his works in 
the curriculum. What has changed from the time Robert College and Üsküdar American 
Academy were treated as ―traitor schools‖ for schooling and educating Bulgarian 
intellectuals to the present time when some intellectual graduates of these schools, 
motivated by nationalistic sentiments, can undoubtedly and unhesitatingly label a 
prominent novelist of Turkey as a ―traitor‖ because of the speech that he made and 
downgrade one of the most prestigious literature awards
6
 in the world?    
Sylvia Walby suggests that nation building is a continuous process which 
operates with ‗rounds of restructuring‘. For Walby, ―rather than one critical period of 
‗nation formation‘ it is more appropriate to talk about ―rounds of restructuring‖ of the 
nation state‖ (1996, 246). In order to understand the current round of restructuring of 
nationalization process in Turkey, it is necessary to elucidate the changing political 
conditions that Turkey had been going through since the 1990s. I agree with Ümit Cizre 
                                                          
6
 Needless to say that Orhan Pamuk has won many other literature awards before and after he made ―the 
controversial speech‖. Some of these awards are: 1983 Orhan Kemal Novel Prize (Turkey) for his novel 
Cevdet Bey ve Oğulları, 1984 Madarali Novel Prize (Turkey) for his novel Sessiz Ev , 1990 Independent 
Foreign Fiction Prize (United Kingdom) for his novel Beyaz Kale, 1991 Prix de la Découverte 
Européenne (France) for the French edition of Sessiz Ev : La Maison de Silence, 1991 Antalya Golden 
Orange Film Festival (Turkey) Best Original Screenplay Gizli Yüz, 1995 Prix France Culture (France) for 
his novel Kara Kitap : Le Livre Noir, 2002 Prix du Meilleur Livre Etranger (France) for his novel My 
Name Is Red : Mon Nom est Rouge, 2002 Premio Grinzane Cavour (Italy) for his novel My Name Is Red, 
2003 International IMPAC Dublin Literary Award (Ireland) for his novel My Name Is Red,  2005 Peace 
Prize of the German Book Trade (Germany), 2005 Prix Médicis étranger (France) for his novel Snow : La 
Neige, 2006 Washington University‘s Distinguished Humanist Award (United States), 2006 Ordre des 
Arts et des Lettres (France), 2008 Ovidius Prize (Romania), 2010 Norman Mailer Lifetime Achievement 
Award (USA).  
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and Menderes Çınar (2003) who argue that no major element of Turkish politics at 
present can be understood without reference to the February 28, 1997 when military-
dominated National Security Council (NSC) issued the coalition government of Welfare 
Party (Refah Partisi) and True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi) with a list of measures 
designed to nullify the supposed Islamization of Turkey and fortify the secular system. 
Subsequently, the coalition government collapsed in June 1997. The plan of the Turkish 
Armed Forces (TAF) during the February 28 process was to refashion Turkey‘s political 
landscape along Kemalist lines and ensure the continuity of the basic assumptions of the 
Kemalist model the guiding vision of which is a Westernizing/civilizing ideology whose 
inconvertible maxims are secularism, a modern/Western identity and life-style, and the 
cultural homogeneity and territorial unity of nation.    
Before the February 28 process, the Islamist movement argued that the 
Westernizing elite of Turkey was preventing people‘s moral development and singled 
out secularism as the main focus of its criticism (Cizre and Çınar 2003). This Islamist 
stance against secularism was the main constitutive element that (re)constructed the 
perception of threat by the Turkish secular public who construed Islamism and Islamists 
as symbols of potential danger to the republican values and Western life-styles. Among 
these Islamists, a reformist faction separated itself and eventually formed the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan and came to power 
in the elections of 2002, won a second term in office with a clear victory in 2007. 
Today, the rising power of AKP which has Islamist roots disturbs secular middle and 
upper-middle classes to such an extent that ―two Turkeys‖ continue to push their 
competing visions for the country‘s future. One broad camp comprises supporters of 
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secular republican tradition founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, while the other is made 
up of those who want to reshape the Republic, chiefly along Islamist lines (Baran 2008).  
This trajectory of Turkish political life shaped the discussions of this research. I 
think that the current polarization of Turkey along the aforementioned two different 
lines is very important in understanding the responses of my interviewees. A working 
understanding of the political landscape of contemporary Turkey is necessary to make 
unfailing and effective assessments on the perceptions and feelings of my interviewees. 
This study, therefore, aims to analyze the positioning of the contemporary Turkish elites 
in the current round of restructuring of the nation state, and asks: what does it mean to 
be a graduate of an ―elite‖ school? What is the role of elite schools in the formation of 
elites? How do the elites socially position themselves in contemporary Turkey? How 
are social distinctions generated, enhanced, legitimated?  What kind of nationalism(s) 
are emerging in contemporary Turkey and how do the elites internalize and/or idealize 
these nationalism(s)? What is the role of the elites in the discursive reproduction of 
secular identities and how do they realize their secular and national selves?  
One of the arguments that inform this study is that there is a structural homology 
between elite schools and ―space of positions‖ (Bourdieu 1996) elites occupy. In an 
attempt to study perceptions and manifestations of ―self‖ and the ―other‖ from the 
perspective of individuals who belong to the upper-middle class –that is the ―elite‖ of 
contemporary Turkey- I have interviewed the graduates of two ―elite‖ schools; Robert 
College and Üsküdar American Academy. This study has an ―upward gaze‖ in the 
words of Sarah Neal (2009), aiming to analyze how contemporary elites socially 
position themselves and examine the structures that shape their social attitudes. It is also 
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an attempt to contribute to the gap in Turkish scholarly literature on the formation, 
reproduction and conceptualization of the Turkish elites.  
1.1. Why Study Elites? 
In a study to explore the cultural engagement of contemporary British elites, 
Wande and Bennett argue that there are striking similarities in British elites‘ tastes both 
by way of norm and practice. All read, all like classical music, almost all go to 
orchestral concerts, more significantly, almost all are regular visitors to the opera which 
plays ―a central role in the mobilization, organizations and connections of this stratum‖ 
(2008, 243). Almost all frequently visit art galleries, concerts and theatres which form a 
part of the regular social rhythms and expectations of their professional lives. Following 
Pierre Bourdieu‘s conceptualization and terminology, Wande and Bennett argue that 
British elites endow marks of distinction (a specialty, a manner, a life-style), and 
represent high-class habitus. These authors portray a picture of significant involvement 
of elite members in the governance of culture and show that elites are not an aggregate 
but a cohesive group which has its own norms and practices.  
These patterns of cultural consumption, as well as cultural governance, show 
that elites have a significant role in the reproduction of the cultural field. Within this 
context, I understand cultural consumption to be the engagement of the elite in 
exclusive activities, marking their separation from other groups in society by their 
prestige and refinement. Cultural governance, on the other hand, is a control technique 
to secure and maintain this separation (Wande and Bennett 2008).  
I argue that looking into the structures and systems that create the involvement 
and governance of elites in various fields is fundamental to understanding the social 
10 
 
dynamics of change. I agree with Castells who argues that ―the fundamental form of 
domination in our society is based on the organizational capacity of the dominant elite 
that goes hand in hand with the capacity to disorganize those groups in society which, 
while constituting a numerical majority, see their interests partially (if ever) represented 
only within the framework of the fulfillment of dominant interests‖ (quoted in Savage 
and Williams 2008, 2).  
Who, then, are the elites? How do they become elite? What is the mechanism 
that reproduces the dominance of a few selected individuals? How does the selection 
process occur? What is the role of these individuals in cultural, social and political life? 
In order to find answers to these questions, social scientists need to study ―up‖ for ―the 
quality of life may depend upon the extent to which citizens understand those who 
shape attitudes and actually control institutional structures‖ (Nader 1973, 284).    
From an anthropological point of view, Laura Nader argues that anthropologists 
may gain new perspectives by studying up as well as studying down (1973). Observing 
the abundant literature on the poor, the disempowered and the disadvantaged, she 
problematizes the tendency to study only down. However, this one sided approach to 
power relations, she suggests, may prevent the anthropologist to capture the whole 
picture within which not only the non-elite but also the elite are active agents capable of 
regenerating new questions that may enhance the scientific adequacy of any analyses on 
networks of power. In other words, a double-sided approach to power relations may 
enable the social scientist to attain a working understanding of power in terms of the 
processes that generate any form of social action, relationship or order.  
It is the invisibility of the elites in social sciences that has initially invigorated 
me to study up. Recognizing the prominence of elites in the global order, I argue that 
11 
 
scrutinizing few distinguished individuals who exercise power over the many, is 
fundamental to understanding the dynamics of contemporary social change. However, it 
should be noted that, although my research takes the unit of observation as individuals, 
the key to the task of problematizing power relations is not to be found in the elites 
themselves but in the broader systems, processes and structures of which they are part. 
Hence, in Pierre Bourdieu‘s terms, this study aims to explore the ―space of positions‖ 
which is occupied by the elites (Wacquant 1993). In other words, I will try to 
problematize the politics of power by studying ―up‖ rather than studying ―down‖.  
1.2. The Characteristics of Elite Schools 
What are the characteristics of these educational institutions that are called the 
―elite schools‖? What makes these schools exceptional by the standard of most public 
schools? Apparently, they not only provide education but also ―serve the latent function 
of acculturating the members of the younger generation, especially those not quite to the 
manor born, into an upper style of life‖ (Gaztambide-Fernandez 2009, 1091). According 
to Gaztambide-Fernandez, who is an education specialist, elite schools can be discussed 
along five dimensions. (1) Elite schools are typologically elite: they are independent 
schools. The characteristics of an independent school can be defined as: ―self-
governance, self-support, self-defined curriculum, self-selected students, self-selected 
faculty and small size‖ (2009, 1100). (2) These schools are scholastically elite: ―based 
on both the expansive and sophisticated curricula they offer and their particular 
pedagogical approaches‖ (ibid, 1093). (3) Elite schools are historically elite, based on 
the role of elite social networks in their historical development. (4) They are 
geographically elite, based on their physical character and location. (5) Elite schools are 
demographically elite, based on the population that attends them. A discussion of the 
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pre-eminence of RC
7
 and UAA
8
 as elite schools along these five dimensions is 
presented below.   
1.2.1. Robert College (RC) 
Typologically elite: RC was established in 1863 in the era of Tanzimat (1839-71). Like 
the other missionary schools in Istanbul, RC was the offspring of the Ottoman Empire‘s 
attempts to ―modernize‖ which was conceptualized as ―westernization‖. It has been 
governed by a self-perpetuating board of trustees and has self-supported itself by fund-
raising since then. Since 1926, it has been obliged to implement the curriculum defined 
by the Ministry of Education. However, with the exceptional rights granted to it by the 
Lausanne Treaty (1923), like all other missionary schools, RC (and other foreign private 
schools) has the privileged advantage of managing the national curriculum in a more 
flexible way, more than any Turkish private or minority school can.
9
 Students are 
admitted to RC on the basis of a highly competitive national examination. As a general 
rule, new students are drawn from the top 5% of those taking the examination. 
Scholastically elite: The statement of purpose of RC is; ―Today, RC seeks to graduate 
young men and women with the skills, insights, and determination to function as leaders 
and contributing citizens in a wide range of social and cultural roles, both locally and 
internationally‖ (www.robcol.k12.tr). To satisfy these goals, RC offers sophisticated 
courses of study which can also be evaluated by the success of the graduates in different 
                                                          
7
 On Robert College see John Freely, A History of Robert College, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2000; A Bridge 
of Culture: Robert College and Boğaziçi University, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009; Keith M. 
Greenwood, Robert College: The American Founders, Boğaziçi University Press, 2000;  Hester 
Donaldson Jenkins, Robert Kolej‟in Kızları, Dergah Yayınları, 2008; Mary Mills Patrick, Son Sultanların 
İstanbulu‟nda, Dergay Yayınları, 2009. 
8
 On Üsküdar American Academy see Fay Linder, The History of Üsküdar American Academy 1876-
1996, SEV Printing and Publication, 2000. 
9
 It should be noted that Ministry of National Education is the centralized body in Turkey which makes all 
the decisions regarding the educational issues mentioned here. I am not saying that RC is free to define its 
own curricula but rather has the autonomy to act with less restrictions compared to other type of schools.  
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areas of life. ―Robert College is proudly responsible for the first female college 
professor, the first chief delegate to the U.N., the first novel written in English by a 
Turkish author, the first Turkish actress to perform on American and English stages, the 
first Turkish ambassador to China, the first TV director, the first Minister of Culture, the 
first Turkish playwright on Broadway, the first female Turkish piano virtuoso, the CEO 
of the largest Turkish non-government bank, the CEO of the largest Turkish industrial 
company…‖(www.robcol.k12.tr).10 
Historically elite: RC is the first missionary school founded in Turkey. Its initial 
purpose was to provide higher education. After the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic, higher education institution facilities of RC were donated to the Turkish 
government and Boğaziçi University was founded. How RC perceives itself as a 
historically elite school is worth noting: ―Robert College graduates have had, and 
continue to have, a remarkable influence on the Republic of Turkey and its role in the 
society of nations. No time is more critical than the present to support the mission of 
this historic institution: to educate Turkey‘s brightest young people- its future leaders- 
who will determine the path of this nation of enormous strategic importance‖ 
(www.robcol.k12.tr). 
Geographically elite: RC‘s location and physical character suffice to define it as a 
geographically elite school. It sits on a 65 acre wooded campus overlooking the 
Bosphorus on the European side of Istanbul, home to both historic and modern 
buildings, centennial trees and a rich fauna. The setting and the facilities is a very 
unique one compared to all other high school campuses in Turkey and is much better 
equipped in many ways even when compared to university campuses in Turkey. The 
                                                          
10
 The first Nobel Prize winner is not mentioned on the webside. 
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campus is situated in one of the highest socio-economic neighborhoods of Istanbul, 
between Ulus and Arnavutkoy. 
Demographically elite: Because of its high tuitions, only families with high income can 
afford sending their children to RC. However, in an effort to work against the 
presumption of elitism, RC is working hard to claim that the demographics of their 
students are more inclusive than they actually are. RC is granting scholarship to 
―bright‖ students from Anatolia and trying to change the face of its student body. 
1.2.2. Üsküdar American Academy (UAA) 
Typologically elite: UAA was founded in 1876 in Bahçeçik by the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions. It has been governed by the American Board of 
trustees and self-supported itself by fund-raising until The Health and Education 
Foundation (SEV) was founded. SEV was established in 1968 by the graduates of the 
American Board Schools, namely, the American Collegiate Institute in İzmir, the Tarsus 
American College and the Üsküdar American Academy and some foreigners. The 
property of the schools was gradually transferred from the foreign owners to SEV and 
in the 1980s foreigners resigned because the new law on foundations did not allow 
foreigners to serve on the board of directors. Today, SEV owns and governs UAA 
without the support of the American Board. In 2010, SEV took the decision of leaving 
its status of being a foreign school and applied to the Ministry of Education to operate 
as a Turkish private school. The application was accepted. The results of this decision 
and the new status are yet to be seen. The school is obliged to implement the curriculum 
defined by the Ministry of Education. Students are admitted to UAA on the basis of a 
highly competitive national examination. As a general rule, new students are drawn 
from the top 5% of those taking the examination. UAA selects its own teachers and 
administration.  
15 
 
Scholastically elite: Üsküdar American Academy aims to pursue ―excellence in 
education‖ in a time of rapid change within the Turkish culture. UAA‘s immense 
experience in education supports it in providing sophisticated and challenging courses 
to its student body. Until UAA became a co-educational institution in 1990, its objective 
was to ―help Turkish women through knowledge, skills and aptitutide, to bridge the 
gaps between the traditional role of women that was called for by a modern, changing 
world, with emphasis on serving mankind‖ (Linder 2000, 126).  The teaching 
environment at UAA is very demanding both personally and professionally. Teachers 
need to possess qualities such as sensitivity, tolerance, and flexibility. Further, they 
need to have sound teaching skills, which are challenged on a daily basis. If the 
prospective candidate understands these special attributes of the school, then he or she 
could be a valued addition to the faculty.     
Historically elite: UAA is one of the first missionary schools founded in the lands of the 
Ottoman Empire. It started its mission as an Armenian Girls‘ Schools which in those 
days provided an exceptional education for girls in Bahçeçik (Bardizak is the original 
Armenian name) and later in Adapazarı. Gradually, it became an international school 
located in Constantinople welcoming all national groups and teaching them in English 
and Turkish. After the Republican reforms, it became a completely secular institution 
with an emphasis on the training of the ―Turkish women of the future‖.   
Geographically elite: The current campus of Üsküdar American Academy is situated on 
a hill in a residential district of Üsküdar. The school campus includes 8 buildings sited 
on 18,000 square meters. Currently a long-term renovation program is in place to 
modernize the physical plant. The UAA is best known for its beautiful gardens with 
lovely trees and flowers.    
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Demographically elite: UAA, like RC, serves a very small portion of the student 
population in Turkey. It aims to select the ―best‖ students whose families can afford 
high tuitions. The selection procedure and high tuitions imply also the selection of 
families with social, cultural and economic capital as well as the disposition to 
recognize the unique advantages that this institution can transmit the students.      
 
1.3. Research Design 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the views of individuals who belong to 
the middle-upper class in contemporary Turkey. These individuals, having graduated 
from elite schools and occupying positions of power within social institutions and 
systems, will be taken to be representatives of the Turkish elites. However, this study is 
not interested in particular events or individuals but rather in the political values, 
attitudes and beliefs of the elites. Hence, it aims to examine important parameters that 
guide the elite‘s definition of problems and their responses to them. In other words, it is 
a study about the shared habitus of the elite; an attempt to access to the embeddedness 
of perceptions, feelings, thinking and situatedness of the elites. I am aware of the fact 
that a habitus study cannot be conducted solely on interviews. Therefore, I have 
incorporated my own experiences and observations into the research. However, this 
study still remains limited but hopefully it will provide a ground for other researchers 
who can utilize for carving out space for elite-based research in Turkey.     
In order to gauge the subtle aspects of elite views of contemporary Turkey, I 
have conducted semi-structured and open-ended interviews with 19 elites who have 
graduated from Robert College and Üsküdar American Academy (see Appendix). My 
interview questions covered the following areas:  
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1) Life Story: Family information, school experience, education, occupation and 
profession  
2) Nation and nationalism(s) 
3) The Kurdish question 
4) The Armenian question 
5) Ataturkism and Atatürk 
6) Rise of Islamism, secularism, Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the 
headscarf controversy 
7) Perceptions and feelings about the future of Turkey.  
 
 
The interviewees whose privacy I have attempted to protect in the following 
pages were randomly selected. Out of 19 interviewees 12 are women and 7 are men. 
Having middle or upper-middle class families, the group of people I have interviewed 
value education above everything else. They are all competent at least in one Western 
language. All of them are professionals who have expertise in one or more areas and 
occupy leading positions with prestigious careers. They either run their own businesses 
or work as highly qualified professionals for the leading domestic or international 
companies/institutions/organizations in Turkey. They all belong to high socio-economic 
class. Both their houses and work places are located in the most prestigious 
neighborhoods of Istanbul. Most of them have spent long periods of time in USA and/or 
Europe either studying or working or both.     
Elite interviewing –like other interviews- has some methodological challenges 
and difficulties. Some scholars argue that the basic challenge of elite interviewing is the 
methodological difference between ―studying up‖ and ―studying down‖. ―Studying up‖ 
is an inquiry on the elite who are in positions of power whereas ―studying down‖ is 
concerned with ―ordinary, powerless people‖ (Neal and McLaughlin 2009; Morris 
2007; Conti and O‘Neill 2007; Smith 2005; Kezar 2003; Neal 1995; Cormode and 
Hughes 1999). Margaret Desmond, who problematizes elite interviews, suggests that 
―working in an elite field poses major difficulties which stem from the challenges of 
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researching up, which are quite different to those encountered in studying down‖ (2004, 
262).  It is assumed that when studying down, the power imbalance between people 
who are researched and the researcher is basically in favor of the latter. Studying up, on 
the other hand may reverse this power imbalance because of the tendency of the elites to 
manipulate and/or take control of the interview. Sarah Neal voices this challenge of 
having an ―upward gaze‖ during her doctoral research by arguing that power very much 
seemed to reside with her research participants rather than herself and any attempt to 
flatter research relationship was not only difficult but also inappropriate (1995).  
Do we need such an up/down distinction at all? Aren‘t all interviews based on 
relations of power? Is it possible for the researcher to control all the outcomes of any 
interview in the so-called ―easier‖ field of studying down? Relationships of any kind 
can embody power dynamics; this difficulty should not necessarily be confined to the 
context of elite-based research but rather should be tackled as a methodological 
challenge in qualitative research. Matt Bradshaw argues that the up/down distinction 
has at least two difficulties: ―first, it implies that power is held by one individual, who is 
powerful, in relation to, who is powerless; and second, it suggests that one set of rules 
can be used to research up, while another can be used to research down‖ (2001, 204). I 
agree with Bradshaw and, following Foucault, perceive power as a potential rather than 
always possessed (1990). This view treats power as something which is ―exercised but 
not appropriated‖ (Desmond 2006, 645). Power is exercised through different 
modalities such as coercion, seduction, domination, manipulation, etc. but the person 
who exercises it may be changing constantly. This is the reason why I preferred to look 
into the structures of domination rather than individuals who seem to possess power. 
Transferring this view to the interview space, I think that neither the researcher nor the 
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researched is consistently powerful and interview is not a power game but a ‗negotiation 
process.‘ ―All participants in a research collective possess power. Research may be 
largely initiated by one powerful actor (the researcher), but it is then translated and 
transformed with others (research participants), differently powerful. In short, research 
is a fundamentally negotiated project‖ (Bradshaw 2001, 204).  
To conclude, the methodological approach of this thesis was not based on an 
understanding that seeks to protect the vulnerable researcher against the all-powerful 
elites who may manipulate or take control of the interview. It is rather based on a 
realization that complex modalities of power which are embedded in every interview 
situation exist. All kinds of inequalities such as social status, gender, age, ethnicity etc., 
are part of our lives and all interview situations. My aim as a researcher was to navigate 
between and negotiate these different modalities of power.  
I also want to highlight some practical insights on elite interviewing:        
Gaining Access: One initial challenge of the researcher of the elite is the difficulty in 
gaining access to the elite. (Neal and McLaughlin 2009; Morris 2007; Conti and O‘Neill 
2007; Smith 2005; Desmond 2004; Lilleker 2003; Kezar 2003; Berry 2002; Cormode 
and Hughes 1999; Marshall 1984; Zuckerman 1972;  Smigel 1958). When studying the 
elite, the researcher is dependent on the cooperation of a relatively small number of 
people who are not accessible without the help of intermediaries. I have reached the 
elites through my friends, relatives and business environment.  
Presentation of the research: Harriet Zuckerman who has done an extensive research on 
the Nobel laureates, whom she calls ultra elites, provides insight about the attitudes of 
the elites toward the prospect of being interviewed (1972). First of all, the request of the 
interview should be legitimate and legitimacy is judged by the researcher‘s affiliations. 
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In other words, the content of the interview and the nature of the research project should 
be acceptable by the standards of the elites. I tried to give a succinct explanation of the 
research project to the prospect respondent. Also, I tried to be ready to answer all the 
questions about confidentiality and anonymity. Most of the respondents I have 
interviewed, openly declared that they would consent to interview only if confidentiality 
and anonymity is guaranteed.  
Style of questions: Open-ended questions provide a greater opportunity for the 
respondents to organize their thoughts within their own framework (Aberbach and 
Rockman 2002, Stephens 2007). However, one should be aware that the elites 
constantly evaluate the performance of the researcher and ―detect whether questions are 
standardized or tailored to their interests and histories. They resent being encased in the 
straightjacket of standardized questions (Zuckerman, 1972). Hence, I tried to conduct a 
conversational mode of interview which was shaped by both the researcher and the 
respondent. In this mode, I tried to effectively listen both to the voices and silences of 
the respondent and acted upon what s/he hears without standardizing the interview.  
Time constraint: Organization of the research becomes a critical issue in elite interviews 
because elites are busy people who have very little or no time for the researcher. Most 
of the times, a second interview is impossible, as it was in my case. Hence, I paid 
utmost attention to the productivity of the interviews in the limited time that is offered 
to me because managing time in elite interviews may have crucial implications on the 
research project (Neal and McLaughlin 2009; Morris 2007; Conti and O‘Neill 2007; 
Smith 2005; Lilleker 2003; Kezar 2003; Berry 2002; Cormode and Hughes 1999; 
Marshall 1984; Smigel 1958). 
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1.4. Chapter Outlines 
 In the first chapter, I examine the elite perceptions of ―us‖ and the ―other‖. I try 
to provide a theoretical overview of social distinctions and how these distinctions are 
generated, enhanced and legitimated. With an attempt to come up with a working 
definition of ―elite‖, I examine how elites are reproduced. I study the elites I have 
interviewed within a Bourdieusian framework and focus on key concepts of 
Bourdieusian theory such as distinction, habitus, cultural capital and symbolic power.   
In the second chapter, in an attempt to study ―educated ignorance‖, I 
problematize the practices of ―not knowing‖ among the elites. I ask questions about the 
underlying motives and reasons in the production of educated ignorance. I inquire into 
an epistemology of ignorance and ask how elite privilege is constituted in Turkey 
through an epistemology of ignorance. I argue that willful ignorance of the elites is an 
active production and should be conceptualized within the networks of power relations. 
Tracing ignorance in the two controversial issues of Turkey, namely Kurdish and 
Armenian questions, I try to show that willful ignorance serves the latent function of 
sustaining elite positions. 
In the third chapter, I look into secular/anti-secular polarization in Turkey and 
try to examine the (re)construction of secular elite identity and the nationalistic 
discourses that inspire or are supported by this identity. I analyze the headscarf debate 
through the prism of secular elite discourses and problematize assertive, authoritarian 
secularism. I attempt to show that the discourse of Ataturkist nationalism the elites tend 
to internalize and/or idealize generates a politics of anxiety and fear which deepens the 
polarization in Turkey.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ELITES AND SOCIAL DISTINCTIONS 
  
How do the Turkish elites socially position themselves in contemporary Turkey? 
This is one of the main questions of this research. The questions I posed during the 
interviews I had with elites shaped our discussions around the axis of Turkey‘s central 
issues, such as the Kurdish and Armenian questions, rise of Islamism and the headscarf 
controversy, around perceptions and manifestations of freedom and democracy and, 
around feelings like anxiety and fear. These were all believed to have vital importance 
in shaping Turkey‘s future and none of the elites were disinterested. On the contrary, 
they were highly motivated to share their views sincerely and openly with me. 
However, I have observed that, whatever was discussed, the elites are socially distinct, 
culturally different and politically distant to the issues we have elaborated. Each and 
every narrative, in their own way has the tendency to mark a difference between ―us‖ 
and ―them‖, and the desire to remain distant to ―them‖. İdil (35) sums up this attitude by 
saying that ―this is not my life, I do not live my life around these things. They don‘t 
affect me in any way. They are not a part of my life, my being and presence‖.   
 The established distinctions of the elites are reinforced by positioning 
themselves ―above‖ or ―outside‖ of central issues in Turkey, the implications of which 
will discussed in Chapter 2. In order to secure the established distinctions, the elites 
―label‖ the ―other‖ so that ―we‖ can be properly named. This self-acclaimed authority to 
speak in the name of others is a by-product of ―educational qualifications‖ which 
enables and empowers the elites to discern ―us‖ from the ―others‖.  Seher (60), for 
instance, who has been to the east and southeast part of Turkey many times because of 
her occupation, thinks that Kurds are ―gariban” (wretched) who have been oppressed 
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by both poverty and the tribal system ―which in itself has created a kind of compulsory 
slavery‖. Kurds are ―underdeveloped‖ (Melike-30), ―backward‖ (Dilek-60), ―ignorant‖ 
(Murat-36), ―uneducated‖ (Ahmet-66), ―not ready for full democracy‖ (Filiz-49), and 
―have nothing to lose‖ (Gülsen-69). Silva (71) who is an Armenian-Turkish labels the 
Armenians living in Anatolia as bayat Ermeniler (stale Armenians) whereas Sevim (28) 
who is also Armenian believes that Armenia is full of ayı (bear) which, in Turkish slang 
is used as an adjective signifying ―those‖ who lack manners, prestige and refinement. 
She adds to her remarks that the Eastern Turkey is very similar to Armenia in the sense 
that Kurds are also lacking ―distinctive‖ qualities.  
 As for minorities, e.g. Armenians and Jews, Ahmet (66) believes that ―they have 
no real practical problems about living in Turkey, the discrimination discourse of 
minorities is an invention of the West which is best known for its hostility towards 
Turks and Turkey‖ (Ahmet-66). But again, Armenians are ―traitors and liars‖, they 
―betrayed us‖ (Serap-58). ―It is true that decisions with unpleasant consequences were 
taken‖ (Gülsen-69) such as the deportation of Armenians in 1915, but ―there was no 
other way, The Armenians had revolted against us‖ (Sarp-35). ―Even if there has been 
minor Armenian casualties during these events‖ (Defne-25) the ―barbarian Turks‖ 
(Seher-60) are responsible for them. Present-day Turks are believed to have no 
accountability in these events, therefore ―making an apology for 1915 events a useless, 
unnecessary and an inappropriate behavior‖ (Murat-36).  
 Remarkable examples of otherization narratives can be multiplied. Otherization 
engenders distinctions, distances and differences, and seeks ways to legitimize the 
internalized systematic opposition to other classes and ethnicities. The purpose of this 
chapter is to theoretically analyze how social distinctions are generated, enhanced and 
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legitimated. The arguments that inform this analysis are a) elite educational institutions 
are one of the most important agencies of class reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron 
1977) and b) the enhancement of distinction and legitimation of culture is secured and 
sustained through the attainment and possession of economic, social, cultural and 
symbolic capitals.    
2.1. Who are the Elite? 
With a view to obtaining an initial overview and clarification of the concept of 
―elite‖, I shall start with consulting New Keywords: a Revised Vocabulary of Culture 
and Society, where Tony Bennett provides the following definition.  ―Elite implies a 
process of selection- which maybe natural, social or cultural- through which a few are 
distinguished from the many. […] When the term is applied to social sciences, there is a 
further connotation that the few are not just distinguished from, but exercise some form 
of power over the many‖ (2005, 99).   
Viewed historically, the concept of the ―elite‖ was developed in the eighteenth 
century by the aspiring French bourgeoisie as a democratic rallying cry in the struggle 
to break the hegemony of aristocracy and clergy (Hartmann 2007, 2). However, a 
review of the literature reveals that the term elite was not widely used in social and 
political writing until 1919 when Vilfredo Pareto defined the concept of the elite in 
order to emphasize the inequality of individual endowment in every sphere of social life 
(Bottomore 1993; Hartmann 2007). Both Pareto and another Italian social scientist 
Gaetano Mosca (1939) saw the nature of elites as fundamental to understanding the 
characteristics of their societies. However, their main concern was to reveal the 
structural differences of the ―governing elite‖, or the ―political elite‖ or the ―ruling 
class‖ (terms which are used almost interchangeably) as compared to the masses: the 
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non-elite. Hence, within these major works of elite theory proposed by Pareto and 
Mosca, it is not possible to talk about the ―plurality of elites‖ but rather a single 
category of elites which we may term as the political elites who are in a position of 
influencing the exercise of political power. Also, this contrast between the elite and the 
masses creates a dichotomy where power is regarded to be fixed and always in the 
hands of the minority of political elites (Bottomore 1993; Hartmann 2007).   
In contemporary societies, it is neither possible to define the elite as only those 
exercising ―political‖ power nor to divide the whole society into two main strata: the 
ruling minority and the ruled majority. ―There are only functional or sectoral or sub 
elites whose members are distinguished from the rest of the population by the top 
positions they hold in various sectors of society, and which give them a decisive 
influence on the development of the society‖ (Hartmann 2007, 3). Individual 
performance becomes an important parameter in attaining power positions. Moreover, 
the mobile nature of the present day elites requires breaking up with the essentialist 
thinking and adopting a relational mode of thinking which allows us to grasp 
simultaneously different forms of power acknowledging the plurality of elites. It is 
possible to analyze different forms of power through the political, bureaucratic, 
managerial, military, judiciary, intellectual, economic, business, media, culture, 
sporting, religious elites each of which can be historicized in the development of a given 
society.    
2.2. Reproduction of the Elite 
Can all social groups become elite depending on their individual performance?  
What are the mechanisms that produce and perpetuate power? What are the conditions 
under which elites reproduce themselves? C. Wright Mills, in The Power Elite (1959) 
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examines the ―real‖ centers of power in the USA. For him, real centers of power are 
those who are ruling large economic, political and military organizations and he calls 
this group of people the power elite. He argues that becoming elite is not only a matter 
of meritocracy. Individual performance is necessary to access these positions but it is 
not sufficient. Social origin, for Mills, is an important parameter in becoming elite, 
gaining access to elite positions requires one to be a representative of the upper class. 
Moreover, his studies on American power elite show that, schooling plays an important 
role in the reproduction of the elite. Mills argues that the elite schools are ―the most 
important agencies for transmitting the traditions of the upper social classes, and 
regulating the admission of new wealth‖ (1959, 64-65).  
Similarly, in The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power (1989), 
Pierre Bourdieu carries out extensive research on the French school system, mainly on 
grandes écoles which are educational establishments outside the mainstream public 
university system. He argues that elite schools provide the basic condition for the 
reproduction of the elite. In an interview with Wacquant, Bourdieu explains the role of 
the elite schools as follows: ―There exists a structural homology between grandes 
écoles and what I call the ‗field of power‘, and that the originality of these grandes 
écoles consists not in the mere fact that they reproduce the ruling class by ensuring 
favored access to positions of leadership for the children from this class, but that their 
main function is to reproduce a structure, that is, a system of differences and distances‖ 
(1993, 19). He claims these children to be consecrated. ―The grandes écoles produce 
individuals who are perceived to be –and who perceive themselves to be- of a different 
kind, of a superior essence, that is separate in absolute terms, in terms of ascription: no 
matter what they do, what they do is different‖ (28).   
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The argument that western educational institutions are one of the most important 
agencies of class reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Bourdieu 1989; Anderson 
1991) implies that rather than acting as "social mobility escalators" for the "more 
talented" members of ethnic/racial minorities and the white working and middle classes, 
the educational system has a strong tendency to reproduce the existing social order by 
devaluing the cultural capital of dominated groups. ―By judging, classifying, and 
tracking students from dominated class fractions on the basis of the alien standards of 
the dominant, schools perpetuate the extant status hierarchy‖ (Allen and Anderson 
1994). 
Ali Arslan (2004) who has conducted research on the educational backgrounds 
of contemporary Turkish elites argues that the quality and type of education obtained in 
Turkish elite schools and universities has significant influence in achieving elite 
positions. Without problematizing the power relations in contemporary Turkey, Arslan 
supports his argument by a detailed analysis of those in power positions and their 
educational background.     
A more detailed study on the changing parameters of educational field and class 
relations in Turkey is provided in Reproducing Class (2009) by Henry J. Rutz and Erol 
M. Balkan. Rutz and Balkan observe a significant polarization within the middle classes 
in Turkey since the 1980s. The emergence of a new middle class with a struggle for 
distinction, according to the authors, was fueled by the new neo-liberal landscape, 
characterized by commodification, financialization, and privatization. This new middle 
class aimed to distinguish itself from the others in terms of work and life-styles.    
Alongside the privatization of education, schooling, in this period, increasingly 
appeared to be an important field of social distinction. The study of Rutz and Balkan is 
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mainly concerned with the relationship between the formation of a new upper middle 
class and transformations in elite education. They argue that, the formation of a 
privileged class in Turkey is reinforced and constituted by the neo-liberal state, market, 
and family. The neo-liberal state reshapes the educational hierarchy with the help of 
educational reforms that ―institutionalized and legitimated the values and practices of a 
new middle class‖ (p. 39). These reforms set the rules and regulations to be able to 
attend to or ―win‖ the most ―prestigious‖ schools. These schools promise a 
―comfortable material and social future life‖ since the graduates of these schools have 
higher chances in succeeding in national university entrance examination and accessing 
to ―prestigious‖ universities the diplomas of which are etiquettes and tickets for top 
positions in the job market.    
New middle class families that are eager to send their children to prestigious 
high schools seek to ensure that their children will establish for themselves a secure and 
privileged place in the newly emerging educational hierarchies of the neoliberal era. 
Hence, according to Rutz and Balkan, the family, surrounded by the rising tide of the 
market and neoliberal restructuring of the state, remains a vital institution for 
reproducing new middle classes in Turkey.  
2.3. A Theory of Distinction 
Using observation and survey data collected over many years, Pierre Bourdieu 
attempted to reveal that the regularities of taste within life-styles are produced by social 
regularities which always have the potential to generate effects of cultural demarcation 
or distinction. For Bourdieu, cultural practices are markers of underlying class 
distinctions and cultural differences serve as markers of class differences. Class 
differences find expression in status distinctions that rank individuals and groups on 
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scales of social honorability rather than in terms of economic interest only. He writes, 
―social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the 
distinctions they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the 
vulgar, in which their position in the objective classifications is expressed or betrayed‖ 
(1984, 6). 
 Cultural practices are engendered by the same general dispositions, habitus, as 
eating preferences, dress styles, sporting interests, and other facets of day to day culture. 
The sense of distinction, which is the hallmark of legitimate culture, is a form of 
cultural capital that is transmitted both by the family and by the school. Schooling, 
according to Bourdieu, plays a central role in inculcating the acknowledgment of 
superiority, or elite standards of taste.   Cultural knowledge derives its value from its 
potential to generate acts of cultural distinction or demarcation. Elite preferences 
express systematic opposition to those of other classes. Preferences and tastes are 
legitimated in that they appear to originate from qualities of charisma, knowledge, and 
aptitude rather than from distance, from necessity. Bourdieu argues that all symbolic 
forms function to generate social distinction with a claim of legitimate culture and 
acknowledgement of superiority.  
In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu introduces the term ―habitus‖ 
which helps in explaining the mechanisms that produce and perpetuate power (1977). 
He sees a person‘s habitus as mediating between this person‘s position in social space 
and his or her life style. Habitus is a system of dispositions, a general, basic stance 
which determines a person‘s perception, feeling, thinking, behavior and which more 
than anything else, marks the boundaries drawn for every individual by his/her social 
origin and position. In an interview Bourdieu outlines these boundaries as follows: ―A 
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person, who has for example, a petty bourgeois habitus, simply has, as Marx says, 
boundaries in his brain which he cannot cross. He for this reason finds certain things 
simply unthinkable, impossible (quoted in Hartmann 2007, 48).  
In this sense, habitus for Bourdieu is ―structured and a structuring structure‖ 
(quoted in Maton 2008, 51). It is ―structured‖ by one‘s past and present circumstances, 
such as family upbringing and educational experiences. It is ―structuring‖ in that one‘s 
habitus helps to shape one‘s present and future practices. It is a ―structure‖ in that it is 
systematically ordered rather than random or unpatterned. This structure comprises a 
system of dispositions which generate perceptions, appreciations and practices (Grenfell 
2008; Swartz 1997). Bourdieu writes ―the habitus is a system of durable, transposable 
dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified 
practices‖ (quoted in Harker, Mahar and Wilkes 1990, 11). These dispositions or 
tendencies are durable in that they last over time, and transposable in being capable of 
becoming active within a wide variety of social actions. Habitus has a differentiating 
dimension in that dispositions are markers of social positioning.  
The relational analysis of Bourdieu on high-class habitus and educational 
institutions is worth noting. The schools, he argues, take the habitus of the dominant 
group as the natural and only proper sort of habitus and treat children as if they had 
equal access to it. ―The culture of the elite is so near to that of the school that children 
from lower middle classes […] can only acquire with great effort something which is 
given to the children of the cultivated classes –style, taste, wit- in short, those attitudes 
and aptitudes which seem natural in members of the cultivated classes and naturally 
expected of them precisely because they are the culture of that class‖ (quoted in Harker 
1990, 87).  
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In this way, the dominant habitus is transformed into a form of cultural capital 
that the schools take for granted and which acts a most effective filter in the 
reproductive processes of a hierarchical society. Poor achievements of some students 
and success of others, then, is not something inherent in cultural differences, but is an 
artifact of the way the schools operate. Those with the appropriate culture capital are 
reinforced with ―success‖ while others are not (Harker, Mahar and Wilkes 1990; Maton 
2008).                 
Bourdieu‘s concept of cultural capital focuses on the social value of cultural 
habits, dispositions, and skills. Working with various colleagues, he developed the 
concept of cultural capital in order to help address a particular empirical problem—
namely, the fact that ―[e]conomic obstacles are not sufficient to explain‖ disparities in 
the educational attainment of children from different social classes (Bourdieu & 
Passeron 2000, 8). Bourdieu argued that, above and beyond economic factors, ―cultural 
habits and…dispositions inherited from‖ the family are fundamentally important to 
school success (Bourdieu & Passeron, 14). In doing so, ―he broke sharply with 
traditional sociological conceptions of culture, which tended to view it primarily as a 
source of shared norms and values, or as a vehicle of collective expression (Lareau and 
Weininger 2003).  
Economic capital (wealth, income, and property), according to Bourdieu, is not 
the only field of power struggles.  Cultural capital (knowledge, culture and educational 
credentials) is also a resource of power unequally distributed among social classes. For 
Bourdieu, cultural capital exists in three forms. First, it refers to the ensemble of 
cultivated dispositions that are internalized by the individual through socialization, thus 
cultural capital exists in an embodied form. The accumulation of cultural capital in its 
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embodied form begins in early childhood. It requires investment of time by the parents 
and other family members. It sensitizes the child to cultural distinction. In its 
―embodied‖ form, cultural capital is a ―competence‖ or skill that cannot be separated 
from the person who holds it. The acquisition of cultural capital necessarily presupposes 
the investment of time devoted to learning and/or training (Swartz 1997). 
The second form of cultural capital exists in objectified form, referring to objects 
like books, works of art, and scientific instruments that require specialized cultural 
abilities to use.  The third of is institutionalized capital by which Bourdieu means the 
educational credential systems. As the aforementioned study of Rutz and Balkan shows, 
cultural capital along with economic capital is becoming more and more the new basis 
of social stratification. In the third chapter the significance of cultural capital in the 
struggle for distinction will be discussed and emphasized in relation to the Islamist-
secularist conflict.   
 
2.4. The Symbolic Power of Ataturkism and Atatürk as Symbolic Capital 
 
 My interview with Silva (71) who is an Armenian-Turkish was based upon 
questions of being or becoming Turkish, and what represents, signifies and symbolizes 
Turkishness. What does it mean to be Turkish for an Armenian citizen, or to become 
Turkish for a Kurdish citizen? The fact that Turkey is currently going through the 
intellectual and political labor and the process of ―denationalizing the citizenship‖ –to 
borrow the paraphrase from Ayşe Kadıoğlu (2010) - agitated her so much that she 
totally refused the idea that Turkishness can be, let alone should be reconstituted or 
even re-visited. For her, any demand of political and cultural recognition of Armenians, 
Kurds or Islamists lacked ―innocence‖ and was regarded as a betrayal to Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and his reforms.  
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The driving impulse of this refutation was Silva‘s adoration and respect for the 
personhood of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. At one point during our conversation, Silva 
started crying for Atatürk, mourned the loss of a cult figure: for her, the loss implied 
both a physical one and also the loosening of Ataturkist ideas that have not yet been 
fully embraced and understood. Silva expressed her Ataturkism ―in the domains of 
excessive emotion, waves of feeling for a central signifier of contemporary Turkish 
identity, or reverence for a personified image of state‖ (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 193). Both 
for Silva and other elites I have interviewed, what does Ataturkism stand for? What is 
the relation between Ataturkism and the cult figure of Ataturk? How and when was this 
relation established? What does the personhood of Atatürk symbolize for Turkish elites?  
Theoretically put, what is the relationship between symbolic representations and social 
structures of power?   
Bourdieu emphasizes the role of symbolic forms and processes in the 
reproduction of social systems. He believes that the principal mode of domination in 
most societies has shifted from overt coercion and the threat of physical violence to 
forms of symbolic manipulation. For him, there is symbolic power as well as economic 
power. Symbolic systems, for Bourdieu, perform in three related but distinct functions. 
1) Symbolic systems are ―structured structures‖: a means for ordering and 
understanding the social world. Therefore, symbolic systems are related to cognition. 2) 
These systems are ―codes‖ that channel deep structural meanings shared by all members 
of a culture, they function as instruments of communication and as instruments of 
knowledge. Thus, they have a communicative function. 3) Symbolic systems function 
as instruments of domination; that is they serve to sustain the established distances and 
differences between classes (Bourdieu and Passeron 2000).  
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 According to Bourdieu, symbolic systems are classification systems built upon 
the fundamental logic of inclusion and exclusion. All symbolic systems follow this 
fundamental classification logic of dividing and grouping items into opposing classes 
and hence generating meanings through the binary logic of inclusion and exclusion 
(Shwartz 1997, 84). Bourdieu writes,  
―All agents in a given social formation share a set of basic perceptual schemes, 
which receive the beginnings of objectification in the pairs of antagonistic 
adjectives commonly used to classify and qualify persons or objects in the most 
varied areas of practice. The network oppositions between high (sublime, 
elevated, pure) and low (vulgar, low, modest), spiritual and material, fine 
(refined, elegant) and coarse (heavy, fat, crude, brutal), light (subtle, lively, 
sharp, adroit) and heavy (slow, thick, blunt, laborious, clumsy), free and forced, 
broad and narrow, or, in another dimension, between unique (rare, different, 
distinguished, exclusive, singular, novel) and common (ordinary, banal, 
commonplace, trivial, routine) brilliant (intelligent) and dull (obscure, grey, 
mediocre) is the matrix of all commonplaces which find such ready acceptance 
because behind them lies the whole social order‖ (1984, 468). 
 
 
2.6. Turkey Divided 
Turkey‘s political and social landscape has changed since the 1990s. With the 
rise of Islamist movements, the deepening of the Kurdish question and with the impacts 
of globalization, a new version of Kemalism
11
 was inspired. This political, social and 
cultural revitalization which can be called neo-Kemalism (Erdoğan 2009) or 
Ataturkism
12
 (Navaro-Yashin 2002) is structured upon the structure of Kemalism with 
an emphasis on Western, secular and national re-conceptualization of Turkey (Yeğen 
2009) and acts upon the binary oppositions of secular/anti-secular, republican/enemy of 
                                                          
11
 Mesut Yeğen argues that there are historically three periods of Kemalism. According to him, the first 
period is between 1927 and 1937 when Kemalism was constructed. The second period starts in 1950s 
with the defeat of the Republican People‘s Party in the elections. The third period starts in 1990s and 
continues to this day and  attempts to revitalize Kemalism.    
12
 The elites I have interviewed used the term Ataturkism to define their stance, therefore I will be using 
the same term.   
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the republic, çağdaş (up-to date)/backward, Kemalist/non-Kemalist and neo-nationalist 
(ulusalcı)/separatist (Erdoğan 2009).  
 Accordingly, Ataturkism becomes a social and political positioning against the 
emergence of ―other‖ positionings, which in total represents a struggle for the 
preservation of a life-style which is perceived to be under threat. According to the elites 
I have interviewed, Ataturkism is ―a system of thoughts not an ideology‖ (Bora-25), ―a 
life-style, a means to understand the social world around us‖ (İpek-31), ―a world-view 
that paves the way for progress, scientism, çağdaşlık and civilization (Defne25). 
Although the definition of Ataturkism varies among the elites interviewed, I have 
observed that Ataturkism or being an Ataturkist was perceived to be and practiced as a 
dividing line between elites and counter-elites. Ataturkism creates a fundamental logic 
of symbolic distinction that operates socially, politically as well as culturally; it 
functions to differentiate and legitimate inegalitarian and hierarchical arrangements 
among individuals and groups. It acts as a symbolic power that orders social life in 
binary oppositions. It has its own language, performs as an instrument of knowledge 
and communication in defying other knowledges that seek ground for communication.  
 The symbolic capital of Ataturkism is Atatürk himself. Symbolic capital, 
according to Bourdieu, is a form of power that is not perceived as power but as 
legitimate demands for recognition, deference, obedience, or the services of others. 
Bourdieu sees symbolic capital (e.g. status value attached to a person, prestige, honour, 
the right to be listened to) as a crucial source of power. ―It is a collective belief, a 
capital of trust that stems from social esteem‖ (Shwartz 1997, 92).  The depiction of 
Atatürk, in the narratives of the elites, positions him as an eternal symbol of various 
values that have to be protected.  
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―For me, Atatürk is the representative of freedom, whether national freedom or 
individual freedom‖ (Melike-30).   
"There are certain principles which Atatürk established while trying to preserve 
this country. I deeply respect him in his struggle to keep the country together and 
draw a meaningful whole out of it.  An incredible success it is; he was incredibly 
foresighted. There is no one who has this power of foreseeing now." (İdil-37)13  
 
―I think even just the secularism principle alone has changed this country 
entirely. I am grateful to him; if it weren't for him we would be in a very 
different situation now‖. (Murat-36)14 
 
―I do respect Atatürk so much for what he did, for what he managed to do those 
days and for his world view. I esteem him very highly, love him and I believe 
with all my heart and soul that he should be preserved. He achieved the 
impossible; of course, he didn't do it all by himself but as the mastermind of the 
case, he achieved something impossible. I find the criticisms against him very 
unjust. It's a very rare thing that his words and his values are still valid after all 
these years. Atatürk made tremendous changes, but after him the steps were not 
taken at the same level. Therefore, it's apparent that certain things weren't 
digested, and now we are here at this point. If only he had lived longer, it would 
have been much better I guess..." (Filiz-49)
15
 
 
―Were we Ataturkists? [Back at RC] Of course, we were Ataturkist, it‘s a way of 
life. Ataturkism is not static... it was a way of life and I had believed that, our 
ultimate goal was to become a Westernized society. I think, this was also 
Atatürk's ultimate goal. What does a westernized society mean? People who can 
think, who are responsible, self-confident… an equal Western [batılı] 
community... There is no need for rubbish such as as privileged, underprivileged 
etc… I am equal to you brother, like it should be. One should never forget, and 
we were also aware of it back then. Atatürk had defeated the West for us. 
                                                          
13
 ―Atatürk‘ün bu ülkeyi korumaya çalışırken ortaya koyduğu bir takım prensipler var. Ülkeyi bir araya 
toplama çabasına ve bundan anlamlı bir bütün çıkatabilmesine büyük saygı duyuyorum. İnanılmaz bir 
başarı, inanılmaz ileri görüşlü. Bugün bu ileri görüş kimsede yok‖ 
14
 ―Tek başına laiklik ilkesinin bile bu ülkeyi baştan sona değiştiren bir şey olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ben 
müteşekkirim Atatürk‘e, o olmasaydi bambaşka bir yerde olabilirdik‖ 
15
 ―Atatürk'ün yaptıklarına, o gün için yapmayı başarabildiklerine, dünya görüşüne inanılmaz saygı 
duyuyorum, değer veriyorum, seviyorum ve korunması gerektiğine canı yürekten inanıyorum. İmkansızı 
başarmış, tabii ki tek başına yapmadı ama fikir babası olarak inanılmaz birşeyi başardı. Bugün ona 
yapılan eleştirileri çok haksız buluyorum. Bu kadar yıl sonra söylediği sözlerin, vermeye çalıştığı 
değerlerin hala bu kadar geçerli olabilmesi çok sık rastlanan birşey değil. Atatürk müthiş değişiklikler 
yaptı ama ondan sonra atılması gereken adımlar aynı seviyede atılmadı. Dolayısıyla, belli ki birşeyler 
hazmedilmedi, işte bu günlere vardık. Keşke biraz daha yaşasaydı Atatürk, çok iyi olurdu sanki…‖ 
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Atatürk was important for anyone who studied in that school [RC]. On top of 
everything else he did, he was the man who defeated the West‖ (Özkan-69). 16    
 
 Depictions of Atatürk as a symbol of love, respect, success, freedom, pride as 
well as nostalgia, uniqueness and distinction can be multiplied. I agree with Esra 
Özyürek (2006) who argues that Atatürk represents and embodies both the nation and 
―the man‖ that the Republic in the foundation years aimed to create and today aims to 
preserve. The rise of Islamist movement compelled Ataturkists to emphasize the image 
and portrait of Atatürk at every opportunity as a kind of logo (Bora 2003). Turkish state 
is personified and imagined through the symbolisms of Atatürk (Navaro-Yashin 2002). 
The narratives of the elites I have interviewed illustrate how through the symbolization 
of Atatürk, a life-style is both defended and protected. Atatürk becomes the most 
distinctive symbol of the elite habitus because of the Western and secular ―man‖ he 
represents, and because of the values of the nation he has imagined (Nazlı Ökten, 2008).    
Ataturkism, from this perspective, is a ―worldmaking power‖ –in the words of 
Bourdieu- for it involves the capacity to impose the legitimate version of the social 
world and its divisions.   It is this very capacity of Ataturkism which makes it inclined 
to the exercise of symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is a manipulative, non-physical 
form of violence which has ―the capacity to impose the means for comprehending and 
adapting to the social world by representing economic and political power in disguised, 
                                                          
16  ―Biz Atatürkçü müydük? Tabii ki Atatürkçüydük, it‘s a way of life. Atatürkçülük dediğiniz şey statik 
birşey değil ki…. yani o bir hayat tarzıydı ve şuna inanmıştım ki, bizim nihai hedefimiz batılı bir toplum 
olmaktır. Ben Atatürk'ün de nihai hedefinin bu olduğunu düşünüyorum. Batılı toplum ne demek? 
Düşünen, sorumluluğunu bilen, kendine güvenen, yani eşit bir batılı toplum…. yok öyle ―imtiyazlı 
imtiyazsız‖ falan palavralar değil. Doğru dürüst, seninle ben eşitim kardeşim. Şunu hiç unutmamak 
gerekiyor: o gün de farkındaydık sanıyorum. Atatürk bizim için batıya galip gelmiş bir adamdı. O 
mektepte [Robert College] okuyan her insan için Atatürk önemliydi. Yaptığı tüm şeylere ilave olarak, 
farklı olarak, o adamları yenmiş adamdı Atatürk.     
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taken-for granted forms‖ (Swartz1997, 89). To go back to Özkan‘s love and hate 
relationship with the West, it is possible to see how the idealization of Ataturkist 
nationalism sets forth conditions for democratic values such as equality. His narrative 
implies that ―we‖ will all be equal only if ―all‖ of ―us‖ are westernized (read 
secularized). 
Ataturkism is not viewed as a ―worldmaking power‖ by all the interviewees. 
Without problematizing the personhood of Atatürk, Sarp argues that Ataturkism in 
many respects resembles fascism in the sense that it struggles to impose a legitimate 
version of the social world and its divisions as mentioned above.     
―For my part, it is a big mistake that whatever Atatürk said is still being repeated 
by rote. If you ask me, if Atatürk had lived today he would have sworn at us, he 
would have said, "Come on, can't you still get over me?" Well, Atatürk was 
really great, I do remember him with respect too, but we have to get over him. 
We indoctrinate each other with Atatürk. There is no point in it. We cannot get 
over anything like that. We live like we are stuck in 1938. Let us say new things. 
Ataturkism can change, Atatürk can change, so what? Everything changes. 
Didn't Atatürk change the ones preceding him? And now we can change Atatürk 
in turn. Societies progress, cultures progress. The age we are living is changing, 
and so does our way of life... So we must say new things. It doesn't mean 
whatever Atatürk said was wrong, worthless or meaningless for those times. But 
things may have changed till today. Likewise, this goes for everything that has 
happened in the past. It goes for both the Bible and the Koran. It goes for what 
Atatürk said. Everything should be interpreted in the context of its time. What 
you call Ataturkism today is something going towards fascism. People who stick 
by the ideal of a country where only the Turks live consider themselves as 
Ataturkists (Sarp-35).
17
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 Ben Atatürk'ün dediği her şeyin bugün böyle ezbere ezbere tekrar ediliyor olmasını çok yanlış 
olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bana sorarsan, Atatürk şimdi yaşıyor olsa, küfür ederdi bize: ―ulan beni 
aşamadınız mı?‖ derdi. Tamam, Atatürk gerçekten çok büyük bir insandı, ben de çok saygıyla anıyorum 
ama Atatürk'ü aşmamız lazım….. yani Atatürk'ün bize gösterdiği yol bu değil ki. Biz böyle takıldık 
kaldık, Atatürk onu demişti, Atatürk şunu demişti, Atatürk bilmem ne….. sürekli böyle Atatürk'ün dediği 
sözlerle böyle kendimizi şey yapıyoruz, birbirimizi indoctrinate ediyoruz. Bunun hiçbir anlamı yok. 
Birşeyi aşamıyoruz ki o zaman, 1923'te kalmışız veya 1938'de kalmış halde yaşıyoruz o zaman. Yeni 
birşeyler söyleyelim. Değişir, ne olacak ki herşey değişir. Atatürk kendinden önce gelenleri değiştirmedi 
mi? Biz Atatürk'ü de değiştirebiliriz. Toplumlar ilerliyor, kültürler ilerliyor, yaşadığımız çağ değişiyor, 
Atatürk'ün devrimlerinde ne bilgisayar vardı, ne birşey vardı…… yani yaşam şeklimiz de değişiyor……. 
onun için, yeni şeyler söylemek lazım. Bu demek değil ki, Atatürk'ün söylediği şeyler yanlıştı veya 
değersizdi veya o zaman için anlamsızdı. Bazı şeyler bugün için değişmiş olabilir. Bu, böyle tarihte olan 
herhangi birşey için aynı şekilde geçerli, İncil için de geçerli, Kuran için de geçerli, Atatürk'ün 
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Among the elites I have interviewed, Sarp is the only one who perceives 
Ataturkism as a form of fascism. As I mentioned in the introduction chapter, the reason 
why most of the elites I have interviewed constructed their political identity on some 
kind of Ataturkism should be explored through the prism of political polarizations 
currently taking place in Turkey. Most of the elites believe that, if Ataturkism is not 
safeguarded in Turkey, this country will eventually have to confront the possible 
dangers of fundamental Islamism which allegedly has the potential to destroy the main 
pillars of the Turkish Republic.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
söyledikleri için de geçerli. Herşey gününe göre yorumlanması lazım. Zaten, bugün Atatürkçülük dediğin 
faşistliğe doğru giden bir şey. Sadece Türklerin yaşadığı ülke idealiyle yaşayan insanlar kendilerini 
Atatürkçü görüyorlar. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICS OF IGNORANCE 
 
“Ignorance of all things is an evil neither terrible nor excessive, nor yet 
the greatest of all; but great cleverness and much learning, if they be 
accompanied by a bad training, are a much greater misfortune.”  
Plato 
 
 
   "Bu kadar cehalet ancak tahsille mümkün olabilir."  
Sakallı Celal 
 
 
After a long day of interviews, I received a phone call from one of my 
interviewees Filiz (49), who is a Turkish Jewish graduate of Robert College (RC-1980). 
As I was contemplating about the interview I had with her, it was interesting to hear 
from Filiz that the contemplation was both sided. In a very self-critical and self-
reflexive manner, she told me that the interview was very confrontational for her in the 
sense that she realized how ―ignorant‖ she was concerning the burning political issues 
of contemporary Turkey. She told me that it was shocking for her to see that for 
someone like her who is ―highly‖ educated and values education above everything else, 
her knowledge was very limited and imperfect on certain issues concerning Turkish 
social, cultural and political life.  
This lack of knowledge that Filiz allowed herself to accept was not only about 
contemporary Turkey but also about the years she spent at RC. Being a graduate of 
1980 -the year of one of the most violent military coups of Turkey, the year that 
changed the life of most of the people living in Turkey- Filiz, when asked what she 
went through before and during 1980 said that: ―I didn‘t go through anything, it was 
like we were not affected by the changes that occurred in Turkish political life‖. After a 
long silence, she added: ―We were the RC students; we were the top of the top‖. This 
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―top of the top‖ position of the graduates of both RC and Üsküdar American Academy 
(UAA) is very common in the self perceptions of the graduates. This chapter aims to 
inquire the relation between this self-perception and the particular practices of ―not 
knowing‖.    
Throughout almost all my interviews, as we delved into the highly loaded issues 
like the Kurdish or Armenian questions, I observed my informants uneasily confronting 
their remoteness and disconnectedness from some of the central issues that shape 
contemporary Turkish political, social and cultural life. Some, like Filiz, confronted this 
apathy and distance with sincerity and astonishment and some unconsciously and/or in 
silence. By positioning themselves ―above‖ or ―outside of‖ the issues that Turkey is 
struggling with internally and externally and by viewing life from the ―top of the tops‖, 
the elites somehow engendered partial, incomplete knowledges.  
An example of these partial, incomplete knowledges or unknowledges is 
provided by Nazan (37). When explaining why she felt more nationalistic when she 
lived in Europe for almost five years, she states that Turkey and Turkish people are not 
well ―known‖ in Europe. According to her, European people have a misconception 
about Turkey. Nazan explains this misconception as the ―ignorance‖ of the European 
people.    
Question: [In Europe] What was it that made you feel more a nationalist as compared to 
here? Why did you become more nationalist there? 
Answer: You know, when you are there, you are like... I guess minority psychology has 
something to do with it. There, you are few, and people before you don‘t recognize you. 
The state of telling, expressing yourself makes you a little more nationalist probably. 
And also, Turkey is conceived different there, misconceived. 
Q: Misconceived how, do you think? 
A: In fact, when I say misconceived, I mean there is this lack of information. The ones 
who went there from Turkey are not city cultured people, they are from the towns of 
Turkey and in the eyes of the Europeans, Turkey is just these towns. Of course, the way 
they see Turkey is in fact the way they see these towns; they perceive Turks like these 
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burghers. So I think that the ―perception‖ [sic] of Turkish people there is kind of a 
little... incomplete. Turkey is neither just these towns, nor just Istanbul, Etiler, Beşiktaş, 
but a blend of all these. I do not represent Turkey as a whole, and just like this, 
Europeans, being people in that culture level should have understood that the Turks in 
Europe do not represent Turkey either. I‘ve said ―cultural level‖ but I should have said 
―income level‖ instead. [In Europe] Annual gross national product is very high. Now 
that we attribute most of the problems in Turkey to financial stuff, then far more better 
off Europeans‘ being ignorant is less venial, compared to Turkey. […] People with high 
income levels are supposed to have less excuse for ignorance. 
18
 
 
Nazan‘s understanding of economic and cultural capital is intertwined; she 
chooses to correlate the intensity and depth of knowledge to the level of economic 
income and argues that those who have a higher economic income should be more 
knowledgeable and less ignorant. Leaving aside her economic determinism, Nazan‘s 
perception of a period of her life spent in Europe, points out a struggle against the 
misconception of her ―Turkishness‖ which she conceptualizes as a consequence of 
unjustified ignorance of the Europeans. I agree with this conceptualization that calls 
attention to looking into practices of not knowing for a group of people who are 
equipped with economic and cultural capital. Throughout this chapter, I will turn the 
mirror from ―others‖ (such as Europeans) to ―us‖ (specifically Turkish elites) and 
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 S: Avrupa‘da seni buraya nazaran daha milliyetçi hissettiren şey neydi? Neden orada daha çok 
milliyetçi oldun? 
C: Orada şeysin tabii…Azınlık psikolojisi sanırım etkili oluyor. Orada azsın ve karşındaki insan seni 
tanımıyor. Kendini ifade etme, anlatma durumu insanı herhalde biraz daha milliyetçi yapıyor. Bir de  
Türkiye farklı tanınıyor, yanlış tanınıyor. 
S: Nasıl yanlış tanınıyor sence? Avrupa deneyimin daha çok olduğu için, Avrupa‘da ne yönde yanlış 
tanınıyor Türkiye? 
C: Aslında yanlış tanınıyor derken onların da bilgi eksikliği var. Gidenler de şehir kültürü alıp gitmiş 
insanlar değil, kasabadan gitmiş insanlar ve Türkiye onların gözünde bu kasabalar. Tabii, onların 
Türkiye'ye bakışı aslında bu kasabalara bakışı, kasabalılar nasılsa Türkleri de öyle algılıyor. O yüzden de 
oradaki Türk perception‘ı biraz daha bence…. eksik. Türkiye ne sadece bu kasabalar, ne sadece İstanbul, 
Etiler, Beşiktaş değil, bunun hepsi bir harman ama  nasıl ben Türkiye'nin hepsini temsil etmiyorsam, 
oranın da temsil etmediğini artık o kültür seviyesindeki insanların anlıyor olması  gerektiğini 
düşünüyorum. Aslında o kültür seviyesi demeyeyim, o gelir seviyesindeki insanların. Avrupa‘da kişi 
başına gayri safi yurt içi hasılası çok yüksek. Madem, birçok Türkiye'deki problemleri maddi şeylere 
bağlıyoruz, oradaki maddi durumu çok daha iyi insanların bilgisiz olması Türkiye'ye göre daha az 
affedilir birşey. 
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attempt to a) theorize ignorance, b) trace the areas where ignorance is produced in 
Turkish social and political life, and c) lay out the implications of what I will call willful 
ignorance.       
3.1. Theorizing Ignorance 
Ignorance is generally defined as lack of knowledge, information, or education. 
However, a careful examination of the concept reveals that ignorance has many forms. 
Sometimes, what we do not know is not accidental but consciously produced or 
unconsciously generated. In other words, sometimes, ignorance is an active social 
production that is shaped by the social location of the knower. It is this form of 
ignorance this chapter is going to focus on and nowhere is it truer than in the case of 
race and racism. Charles W. Mills, in his essay ―White Ignorance‖, outlines racialized 
ways of knowing which he identifies as an epistemology of ignorance, necessary to 
maintain white privilege in the context of commitments to formal equality (2007). 
Because of structural privileges and situated identities, the whites have a positive 
interest in ―seeing the world wrongly‖ to paraphrase Mills. He argues that on matters 
related to race, there is an ―inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a 
particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are 
psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites in 
general will be unable to understand the world they themselves have created‖ (quoted in 
Bailey 2009, 80). Here, ignorance is not understood as a neglectful epistemic practice 
but as a substantive epistemic practice that differentiates the dominant group. ―A central 
feature of white ignorance is the ability to ignore people without white privilege. White 
ignorance is a form of not knowing (seeing wrongly), resulting from the habit of 
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erasing, dismissing, distorting, and forgetting about the lives, cultures, and histories of 
people whites have colonized‖ (ibid, 85).         
Following Mills and others, I understand ignorance to have an epistemological 
character and thus include it in the epistemologies of knowledge and try to be attentive 
to both knowledge and ignorance. However, my purpose is not to carry out an 
epistemological inquiry. I do not aim to explain what knowledge is, or what we know, 
or how knowledge is acquired, or how we know what we know. I am not seeking out for 
a theory of ignorance that may lead us to a universally accepted justified true belief 
model. Rather, within the context of my research, I am trying to understand how and 
why ignorance regarding major political issues is actively and socially produced by the 
elites who have all the resources and means to access information. Why does a group of 
selected people with the ―best‖ possible training to learn not activate their accumulated 
capacity in order to grasp a fuller understanding of the current affairs of the Turkish 
social, political life? How can educated ignorance (tahsilli cehalet) be explained? What 
constitutes willful ignorance among the elites? How is elite privilege constituted in 
Turkey through an epistemology of ignorance? How can we elucidate this knowledge-
ignorance paradox? 
Among the elites I have interviewed, there are well known lawyers, doctors, 
physicists, economists, bankers, NGO specialists, computer engineers, art specialists, 
civil engineers, education specialists, business people, managers, visionaries and 
entrepreneurs. After graduating from RC or UAA, most of these people had 
undergraduate and graduate degrees from the most ―prestigious‖ universities in Turkey 
and/or in the world. Hence, their commitment to knowledge and acquisition of 
technical, specialized skills allowed them to climb to the top of the ladder of the 
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educational hierarchy, marking their separation from other groups in society by their 
prestige and refinement. Having listened to entrepreneurial and inspiring life-stories of 
the Turkish elites, I observed that they do have a persistent effort to examine any belief 
or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the evidence that supports it. They are 
perfectly competent in utilizing their knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and 
reasoning, and have brilliant skills in applying these methods. They think open-
mindedly and creatively within alternative systems of thought, recognizing and 
assessing their assumptions, implications, and practical consequences. In other words, 
the group of elites I have interviewed are trained to be critical thinkers destined to 
accomplish success stories. Paradoxically though, they have hidden unknowledges 
engendering poor, single or restricted vision of contemporary Turkish social, political 
life. Elites‘ trained mind operates only in particular ways of knowing which are privileged 
over others as Mills points out in ―White Ignorance‖.  
 Educated ignorance is contextual: it operates within contexts that mark the 
difference of the space of position the elites occupy. By aligning the practices of not 
knowing to the hegemonic discourses
19
 that reinforce the sustainment of the dominant 
position of the elite within the society, educated ignorance has a structural and strategic 
character. It is structural because it is dependent on the location and position of the 
knower vis-à-vis the known and it is strategic because it is historical, always used as a 
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 According to Michel Foucault, the concept of discourse involves the production of knowledge through 
language, that is, discourse gives meaning to social practices. For Foucault, discourse regulates what can 
be said under determinate social and cultural conditions and discursive formations are regulated maps of 
meaning or ways of speaking through which meaning is acquired.  Therefore, discourse imposes a 
particular way of thinking. It organizes the field of knowledge and hence directly related to power. 
―Discourse allows us to describe: the self-evident and commonsensical are what have the privilege of 
unnoticed power and this power produces instruments of control…. a kind of power that generates certain 
kind of questions, placed within systems that legitimate, support and answer those questions, a kind of 
power that, in the process, includes within its system all those it produces as agents capable of acting 
within them.‖ (Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge, 1989, 45) 
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means to internalize the habit of erasing, dismissing, distorting, and forgetting about the 
lives, cultures, and histories of ―the others‖, as will be exemplified below through the 
Kurdish and Armenian question of contemporary Turkish political life.   
Educated and willful ignorance is not a simple lack, a gap or an omission. It is 
not a consequence of the limitedness of human knowledge. It is intentional not 
knowing. It is not a presupposition but a social fact that can be deduced, observed and 
explained. It is a kind of refusal to know only specific things. Ignorance is not passive. 
It is cultivated, sustained and allowed. Like knowledge, ignorance is socially 
constructed, maintained and disseminated (McVeigh 2004, Ortega 2006, Smithson 
1985, Tuana 2004, Ungar 2000). I argue that ignorance is an active production, and thus 
related to power. In other words; like knowledge, ignorance has to be conceptualized 
within the networks of power relations.   
In his studies on prisons, mental institutions, clinics and hospitals Michel 
Foucault argues that knowledge is (re)produced by power. By relating knowledge to 
power, Foucault claims that power generates and preserves its rationality through the 
dominant state of ―knowledge‖ at the time. Hence, without some form of legitimization 
which must be endorsed by what is ―known‖ at the time to be ―true‖ or ―correct‖, no 
system of power can maintain itself. In other words, knowledge is not to be found 
outside the networks of power relations. Foucault explains the power-knowledge 
neologism as follows:               
"Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine 
that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that 
knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests. 
Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the 
same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. 
We should admit, rather, that power produces knowledge [...] that power and 
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knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without 
the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does 
not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations [....] In short, it is 
not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of 
knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes 
and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the 
forms and possible domains of knowledge" (1995, 27-28).  
Involving the politics of ignorance in social and political analyses may allow us 
to reveal the role of power in the construction of what is known, and understand which 
knowledges are seen as valuable, important or functional. Which knowledges are 
shadowed by the production of ignorance of the elites? What kind of knowledges are 
rejected, omitted or refused and what kind of discourses are produced in order to 
marginalize and/or hinder other knowledges the elites I have interviewed tend to 
ignore?  
3.2. Positioning Ignorance 
 My oldest informant in this research was 71 years old and the youngest was 25. 
In the almost 50 years between these generations, the Turkish social, political life has 
inevitably changed and evolved in many ways. However, ignorance among the elites I 
have interviewed seems to be a cross-generational production. It is possible to detect 
willful not-knowing in almost all the interviews I have conducted. In this section, I aim 
to trace the two main issues of Turkish social and political life in which ignorance 
manifests itself most in the narratives of the Turkish elites. The first one is the Kurdish 
question which has been one of the most controversial issues in Turkey since the 
foundation of the Republic. The second one is the Armenian question which has turned 
out to be a tug-of-war between various actors the most prominent of which is the 
Turkish state who denies the Armenian genocide and the Armenian Diaspora who 
builds a community around the struggle of the recognition of the genocide. Through an 
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analysis of elite perceptions of these two contested issues of Turkish political life, it is 
possible to see how the production of ignorance eliminates, disregards and shadows 
other knowledges.   
3.3. Kurds and Kurdishness in the Perception of the Elites 
Personally, I've never seen this discrimination stuff since my 
childhood, either in my family or around me. Now let me put it 
this way, Kurdish people living there, for example…  yes, they are 
economically poor, but so are the Turkish people living there. I 
mean they have shared the same thing, it wasn't like Turks were 
better off, but the Kurds were deprived of certain things. It wasn't 
like there were job opportunities but Kurds were denied of them.  
East has always been poor. Southeast has been poor and 
unsettled since the Ottomans. I don't think they have lost aything, 
because they didn't have any... They didn't have much to lose. 
(Gülsen).20 
 
Ignorance as an active production is linked to hegemonic knowledges, doubt, 
mistrust, silencing and uncertainty. The Kurdish question with all its complexities and 
controversies is a fruitful area to study the production of ignorance. The elites I have 
interviewed were asked how they define and perceive the Kurdish question, what their 
views are on the ―Kurdish opening‖ (which is an effort ever made by Justice and 
Development Party to find a peaceful political resolution to the long-festering Kurdish 
question) hand how they think the problem can be resolved. The definition of the 
Kurdish problem is crucial because the success or the failure to resolve the Kurdish 
question rests upon how the problem is defined. It is possible to claim that the elites I 
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 ―Ben çocukluğumdan beri, şahsen, ne ailemde ne çevremde hiçbir ayrımcılık şeyi görmedim. Şimdi 
şöyle diyeyim size, oradaki Kürtler mesela, evet ekonomik şartları zayıf, fakir insanlar ama orada yaşayan 
Türkler de öyle. Aynı şeyi paylaştılar, yani Türkler daha iyiydi de, Kürtler mi bunlardan, işten mahrum 
edildi? Orada iş imkanları vardı da onlara kullandırılmadı diye birşey olmadı. Her zaman doğu fakirdi. 
Osmanlı'dan beri Güneydoğu fakirdi, karışıktı. Birşeylerini kaybettiklerini zannetmiyorum ben, zaten 
yoktu….. kaybedecek fazla birşeyleri de yoktu.‖ 
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have interviewed have a consensus of what the Kurdish question is. If the question is 
not dismissed totally –and maybe sincerely- in the way banker Selim (49) did by saying 
that he ―never really tried to understand and conceptualize what constitutes the Kurdish 
question‖, most of the informants believe that the question has been ―recently 
constructed‖ by the ―deemed to fail‖ Kurdish opening21 initiated by the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) and the intervention of the ―outsiders‖. The belief that the 
Kurdish question has been recently constructed is apparent in almost all narratives of 
the elites included in my research.  
My oldest informant Silva (71) who is a retired Armenian-Turkish believes that 
―until today, there was no distinction or difference between a Turk and a Kurd and 
Kurdishness was not a problem that needed to be addressed‖. When asked with whom 
he had studied at Robert College for Boys, Law Professor Özkan (69) replies: ―It didn‘t 
even cross our minds to think like this one is Jewish, this Armenian or Rum… You 
know, I always think that they are people just like you and me… I was neutral, it didn‘t 
mean anything… Maybe there were people of Kurdish origin who came to be famous 
later, but we didn‘t know it. Sure there were people from Diyarbakır for example, but 
whether they were Turk or Kurd or Laz wasn‘t an issue. There was no such a notion, 
can I make myself clear?‖22 Similarly, Filiz (49) tells me how surprising it was for her 
to ―witness that one of her classmates -after all these years- enunciated that she had a 
Kurdish origin after a fierce debate among a group of old friends on Kurds and the 
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 See Cengiz Çandar (2010), Levent Köker (2010), Murat Somer and Evangelos G.Liaras (2010) for 
discussions of the Kurdish Opening.   
22
 Bu Yahudi, bu Ermeni, bu Rum gibi birşey aklımızın köşesinden geçmiyordu… yani işte sizin, benim 
gibi insanlardı diye düşünüyorum… yani ne müspet, ne menfi bir şeyi yoktu, etkisi yoktu… belki bu 
sonradan moda olan Kürt kökenliler de vardı aramızda ama onları bilmiyorduk…. yani Diyarbakırlı 
insanlar vardı, bu adamlar Kürt müydü, Türk müydü, Laz mıydı? Yoktu öyle bir kavram, yoktu yani 
anlatabiliyor muyum?‖ 
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Kurdish opening‖. Until today, according to Filiz, ―that identity had remained invisible 
and had not been pushed to the surface as a difference‖. I think that this ―non-existence‖ 
of the Kurdish identity in the memories of the elites is partly a proximity issue. Since 
the probability of Kurds‘ attending to elite schools such as RC and UAA is low because 
of the socio-economic conditions of the Kurds, graduates of the older generations might 
have no acquaintance with them in their closest social network.
23
  
One might think that due to the recent scholarships granted to ―bright‖ students 
from Anatolia by the two elite schools studied in this research, the younger generations 
may have more acquaintance with Kurds compared to the older ones. However, this is 
not the case. None of the informants of the younger generation can recall a Kurdish 
friend whereas they remember boarding students who came from the southeastern 
region. Whether these students have a Kurdish origin is not known and has never been 
an ―issue‖. Needless to say, the homogenizing effect of these schools had dismissed the 
emergence of these identities. There is only one exception to this generalization. 
Actually, it is not an exception but an ironic example to emphasize my point from a 
different angle. Defne (25) who is a visual communication designer entered RC at the 
age of 15 after spending her primary school years in the closed community of a well-
known private Turkish school where students went to school with ―chauffeurs instead of 
school buses‖.  Her first year at RC was a ―nightmare‖ for her. Her misery was a 
consequence of the alienation she felt at RC.  
―I was enrolled in Robert College, it was like another world because there were 
many scholarship students there. There were people from cities I had never been, 
people who played saz … that I had never met before… So I was utterly 
unhappy in my prepatory year, I was always like ―I don‘t to want to go to this 
school‖.. […] Therefore it was real bad, my prep year. I cried all the time, saying 
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 See Füsun Üstel and Birol Caymaz, Seçkinler ve Sosyal Mesafe, 2009 for a similar observation, p. 25. 
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―I‘ll leave the school‖, ―I won‘t study here, I can‘t put up with these people.‖ I 
couldn‘t love that diverseness. I couldn‘t get used to it. It felt weird, it felt weird. 
Than this feeling was over after a while, because I got used to there… But I had 
never been one of those students who adored Robert College, never.‖24 
Today, Defne evaluates her first years at RC as a learning process which enabled 
her to understand the unifying power of education and as a gateway to accept and 
appreciate the differences among people. However, the present day emphasis of Defne 
on the student playing the Turkish folk instrument saz is a signifier of regional 
differences between the east and the west, of disparities between the rural and the urban 
and of the high class consciousness embedded in her. Later on, I learned that the student 
playing the saz was an Armenian from Istanbul. The way Defne positions herself within 
the environment that she lives in constructs such distances and differences that 
production and reproduction of ignorance becomes a powerful disruptive mechanism 
that engenders misjudgments, misconceptions and consequently, damages social 
integration.  
In the perception of the elites‘ Kurdish question a complex absence exists: the 
absence of the Kurd and Kurdishness. Analyzing this complex absence only as a 
proximity issue would be incomplete (see above). I argue that this absence or non-
existence of the Kurds in the narratives and lives of the elites is a part an embodied 
discourse, a chapter in the tale of power-knowledge/ignorance nexus. As the above 
quotations illustrate, the elite perceptions of the Kurdish question are based on a denial 
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 ―Robert Kolej'e geçtim, tamamen başka bir dünya çünkü Robert Kolej'de çok fazla burslu insan var. 
Hiç gidip görmediğim illerden insanlar var, saz çalanı var…. daha önce hiç karşılaşmadığım…. O yüzden 
benim Robert Kolej'de hazırlık dönemim tamamen mutsuzluk üzerine geçti, ben bu okulda 
okuyamayacağım diye.. […] Hazırlık benim için çok kötü geçti o yüzden. Ben her seferinde ―bu okuldan 
gideceğim‖ diye ağladım, ―okumayacağım ben bu okulda, yapamayacağım ben bu insanlarla‖ diye. 
Sevmedim o farklılığı. Alışamadım. Tuhaf geldi, tuhaf geldi. Geçti bir müddet sonra çünkü alıştım….ama 
ben hiçbir zaman Robert‘i çok seven bir öğrenci olmadım, hiçbir zaman olmadım‖  
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of any ―problem‖ regarding different identities. The elites I have interviewed insist that 
having an ethnic/cultural identity other than Turkishness has not constituted a problem 
―until recently‖. Embedded in these narratives, there is also a self-acclaimed authority 
to speak in the name of ―others‖, as in the case of the Kurds. To elaborate this point, I 
will refer to Melike and her perception of the Kurdish question.    
After graduating from RC, Melike (30) goes to USA to attend to one of the 
―most prestigious‖ liberal arts colleges where she gets a major and a minor degree. She 
accepts to work as a management consultant for a leading company in the USA. As an 
appreciation of her invaluable services, the company grants her a scholarship to get an 
MBA degree from Harvard University. Later on, because of her ―sensitivity to societal 
issues‖ Melike makes a change in her career path and decides to work for civil society.  
She is now working as a member of the administrative team of a well-known NGO in 
Turkey. She frequently visits the southeastern part of Turkey and has the chance to 
observe and examine the region where Kurdish population is the highest. This is how 
Melike defines the Kurdish question:   
―Kurdish question is a snowballing problem in a region which has not been 
developed enough, which has not been provided with enough services. Why 
does not it develop, because you cannot provide it with services. And the people 
there, you cannot raise their awareness. A family has 10 kids for example. And 
regarding it mathematically, this only serves to nurture the current problem. 
When I say ―problem‖ I mean people‘s living under inhuman conditions, their 
not making use of proper services, their not having necessary means enough to 
lead decent lives. I see it from a humanistic perspective. This problem is not 
only about Turks or Kurds or Middle East, it is about people living there and the 
problems they encounter when they try to lead the beautiful lives they deserve, 
to see different things, to learn things. [….] It is an economic problem, more of 
economic problem [….] In general, I think that most of the problems are about 
economy. I think, the extreme of everything stems from a deprivation of 
something and generally this deprivation proves to be an economical one. [….] I 
don‘t think that things can change unless people are helped to reach a welfare 
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level. I don‘t see the problem as a problem of Turks, Kurds, Lazs, Circassians, 
Afrikans, Serbs or whatever. I see it as a problem of humanity in general.‖ 25 
The first thing to note about this view is that it excludes the Kurdishness of the 
Kurdish question. To put it in Mesut Yeğen‘s words, the Kurdishness of the Kurdish 
question is silenced
26
 in the narrative of Melike. The Kurdish identity and any identity 
related claims of the Kurds are excluded in her attempt to explain the problem. 
Secondly, the problem is defined as a developmental issue. According to Melike, this 
issue is partly in the responsibility of the state because it is obliged to promote social 
and economic welfare and partly in the responsibility of the Kurds living in that region. 
The Kurds are not cognizant either of their conditions or means of improving them. 
Moreover, they resist to reform initiatives by keeping the traditional/tribal way of 
living
27
 which in Melike‘s words is giving birth to 10 children without being able to 
provide better life standards. The perceived incognizance of the Kurds leads to mistrust 
in them and doubt about the possibility of the resolution of the Kurdish question. By 
connecting the Kurdish question to lack of development and regional backwardness, 
                                                          
25 ―Kürt meselesi, yeteri kadar kalkındırılamamış bir bölgede, yeteri kadar hizmet gitmemiş bir bölgede 
daha da çığ gibi büyüyerek giden bir sorun. Büyümesinin nedeni de hizmet götüremiyorsunuz. İnsanları 
da bilinçlendirilemiyor. Bilinçlendiremiyorsunuz. 10 tane çocuk yapıyor bir aile. Bu da matematiksel 
olarak baktığınızda mevcut sorunun sadece büyümesine yol açıyor. Sorun derken, o insanların insani 
şartlar altında yaşamaması, düzgün hizmetlerden faydalanamaması, o insanların güzel bir hayat sürmeleri 
için gerekli, yeterli imkanların olmaması….. ben bunu anlıyorum. İnsani boyutta bakıyorum. Türk‘ün ya 
da Ortadoğu‘nun ya da Kürt halkının meselesi gibi değil, orada yaşayan insanların her birinin hakkı olan 
güzel bir hayat sürebilmeleri, değişik şeyler görmeleri, birşeyler öğrenmeleri için önlerine çıkan bir sorun. 
[….] Ekonomik bir sorun, daha çok ekonomik bir sorun. Ben birçok sorunun ekonomik sorun olduğunu  
düşünüyorum genelde. […..] Herşeyin aşırısının bir yerdeki yoksunluktan kaynaklandığını düşünüyorum 
ve bu genelde ekonomik yoksunluk oluyor. [….] İnsanlar refah seviyesine ulaştırılmadan, imkanlar 
verilmeden çok birşey değişeceğini sanmıyorum. Ben o Türk, Kürt, bilmem ne, Laz, Çerkez, işte Afrikalı, 
Sırp bilmem ne sorunu diye görmüyorum. Genel olarak insanlık sorunu gibi görüyorum.‖    
26
 Mesut Yeğen, ―The Kurdish Question in the Turkish State Discourse‖, p.555, 1999. 
27
 This point is interesting: Mesut Yeğen (2007) notes that Kurdish resistance against any reform (islahat) 
initiatives dated back to the first day of Young Turk Revolution when an Ottoman Army officer stated in 
Diyarbakır that ―The Kurds have a unique problem: it is ignorance‖ (quoted in ―Turkish Nationalism and 
the Kurdish Question‖, p.123). Similarly, Melike and many other elites make reference to the ignorance 
of the Kurds because of their reactionary attitudes towards modernization/westernization. It wouldn‘t be 
wrong to analyze this point as the continuation of the Young Turk mentality. See Şükrü Hanioğlu (2009) 
for a detailed analysis of the mentality of the Young Turks and its implications for today.   
54 
 
this view emphasizes the ―the lack of integration between the region and the national 
economy‖.28 In other words, the problem is simply ―lack of economic integration‖. It is 
in no way an ethnic or a national question. As a result, any endeavor to approach the 
Kurdish question by recognizing the ethnic and national aspect of it is dismissed by 
somehow silently continuing the assimilation mentality of the Republic. Accordingly, 
the Kurdish opening is a ―doomed to fail attempt‖ (Seher-60), has paved the way for the 
―vilification of the other‖ (Esra-25), ―created sociopolitical polarization‖ (Filiz-49). It is 
nothing but an ―empty package that is devoid of any substance‖ (İpek-31) and it is 
simply ―wrong‖ (Serap-58), because, ―we don‘t have a Kurdish problem, we never had 
one‖ (Ahmet-66).  
The tendency of the elites to perceive the Kurdish question as a historyless or 
―recently constructed‖ problem and the elimination of the ethno-political aspect of it is 
where ignorance is produced. This view is the internalized version of a part of the 
Turkish State discourse which identifies the Kurdish question as a product of 
backwardness of the regions inhabited by the Kurds.
29
  
By silencing the Kurdishness of the Kurdish question, by eliminating and/or 
rejecting the production of any other discursive formation by the Kurds (such as Kurds‘ 
political and identity related claims
30
) and by internalizing the discourses of the Turkish 
State, the elites reproduce ignorance and sustain the hegemonic discourse that 
―enunciates the exclusion of Kurdish identity‖ (Yegen 1999, 555). Hence a) the 
relationship, if any, of the Turkish elites with the Kurds is a relationship of exclusion 
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 Mesut Yeğen, (2007), ―Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question‖, p. 132. 
29
 See Mesut Yeğen (1999, 2007, 2009) for detailed analyses of the Kurdish question and the Turkish 
State‘s historical discursive formations on the question.   
30
 For understanding Kurds‘ political and identity related claims, see the report ―A Roadmap for a 
Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the Region for the Government‖ (2008) released 
by TESEV.  
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that is based on a politics of denial of the Kurdish identity, and b) elites‘ sense of self 
develops as the Kurds are categorized as the ―other‖ because of their ―insistence‖ on 
tribal ways of living, ―resistance" to westernization/modernization, their 
―backwardness‖ and ―ignorance‖ as opposed to the ―enlightenment‖ of the 
―westernized/modernized‖ elites, and c) patterns of structural differentiation in society 
can conceal the information that is needed to develop an accurate diagnosis of the 
Kurdish question that confronts the Turkish society as a whole. In other words, the 
group identity and the space of position that the elites occupy vis-à-vis the Kurds 
disallows the elites to consider the Kurdish question in its own context, and structural 
ignorance deeply rooted in the narratives of the elites (re)produces the categorization of 
the Kurds as the ―other‖, eliminating the formation of other discourses than the 
hegemonic ones.    
3.4. Otherization through the Armenian Question 
 The Armenian question constitutes of embedded nationalistic discourses that 
formulate, reconstruct and reproduce the category of the ―other‖ for both the Armenians 
and Turks (Akçam 2008; Göçek 2006). As a result, what happened to Armenians in 
1915 is highly politicized and any discussion of the Armenian deaths and massacres of 
1915 tends to reflect the nationalistic visions of these historiographies. Fatma Müge 
Göçek suggests that ―nationalism polarized the Armenians and the Turks and caused 
them to challenge the other‘s existence‖ (2006, 115). Accordingly, the dominant 
nationalistic discourses on the Armenian question either recognize or deny the deaths 
and massacres of the Armenians. Moreover, the term ―genocide‖ used to define what 
happened to Armenians toward the end of the Ottoman Empire is still being contested 
and is ―sacred to Armenians and taboo to Turks‖ (Akçam, 2006, 9). As Halil Berktay 
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observes ―There is an intensely violent polarization of political attitudes. One of the 
polars is the ‗policy of genocide confirmation and registration‘ and the other is the 
‗policy of genocide denial‘. In this atmosphere of polarization which leads to 
intellectual terror, it becomes impossible to talk in middle grounds‖ (2001, 95).    
 During my interviews with the elites, I have experienced this difficulty of not 
being able to talk about the Armenian question without falling into this terminological 
trap of identifying the question only in relation to genocide denial or genocide 
confirmation. As Michel–Rolpf Trouillot rightly argues ―terminologies demarcate a 
field, politically and epistemologically. Names set up a field of power‖ (1995, 115).    
Despite my efforts to discuss the Armenian question within its historical and social 
context, and without falling into the terminological trap, the narratives of the elites are 
clearly characterized by genocide denial or genocide recognition (only by two 
Armenian informants), hence the power fields are demarcated and nationalisms are 
produced.  
 My purpose is not to reproduce more nationalism(s) by rotating around 
genocide, non-genocide claims but to analyze the question beyond the terminological 
traps and define how the elites position themselves with respect to the Armenian 
question.
31
 Just like the Kurdish question, Armenian question is a political and 
epistemological field of producing ignorance fueled by uncertainties, mistrust and 
silencing.  
                                                          
31
 Among others, see Taner Akçam (2006, 2008), Hamit Bozarslan (2008), Halil Berktay (2001, 2004), 
Selim Deringil (2010) and Fatma Müge Göçek (2006) for an account of 1915 events and the Armenian 
question concerning these events.  
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 The 1915 events are regarded as an ―unknown‖ in the narratives of the most of 
elites I have interviewed. An “unknown” that the elites want to take no responsibility 
of: ―Of course, it must be done, but I didn‘t have a look at the history books, but I think 
that both Armenia‘s and Turkey‘s and other countries‘ archives should be opened up 
and this should be discussed by the historians. It is not the government members who 
should discuss it; a scientific committee, an entirely scientific, independent committee 
should discuss this question...‖ (Esra-25).  
 An “unknown” that creates uncertainties and mistrust: ―You were in the middle 
of a war. And while the whole country was at war at different fronts, there are 
documented facts [sic] that Armenians have rebelled against and killed a lot of civilians, 
and they don't have to be civilians, they could have killed soldiers... the reaction shown 
is out of scale and unnecessary. Both sides have massacred each other.. I don't know 
what it is called.. but if you ask the Turks, they say "Armenians, did this, did that to us‖. 
If you ask the Armenians, they say Turks did this, did that to us.‖ (Sarp-35)32 
 
 An “unknown” that constructs a defense narrative against the Armenian 
“other”: ―You united with the Russians. There was a war going on and your people 
have fought against us along with the Russians. What happened? Deportation. It is not 
                                                          
32  ―Zaten bir savaşın ortasındasın. Bütün ülke değişik cephelerde savaş halindeyken, Ermenilerin orada 
ayaklandığı ve bir sürü yine sivil insanı öldürdüğü -sivil olmak zorunda değil, askerleri de öldürmüş 
olabilirler- bunlar da documented şeyler………. onun karşılığında gösterilen tepki, bence ölçüsüz ve 
gereksiz. İki tarafta birbirini bir şekilde katletmiş…. artık adı nedir bilmiyorum….. ama Türklerle 
konuşsan, ―Ermeniler bize şöyle yaptılar, böyle yaptılar‖ diyor. Ermenilerle konuşsan ―bize şöyle 
yaptılar, böyle yaptılar‖ diyor.‖  
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only us who did that. This was done ouf of necessity. These are all reasons to put 
Turkey under pressure (Gülsen-69).33  
 An “unknown” that silences the claims of the “others” and unearths the secret 
fears of the powerful elite against the many “others”: I would reject something that has 
not been proven that it happened, I believe anyone would do the same as a defense 
mechanism. I think we, as Turkey, are not strong in the international arena and because 
of this, I believe we are manipulated. The games of big powers -and when I mean 
powers, I am not talking about countries anymore. These are a handful of people, a 
group of very powerful people [sic]. I think that, due to the agendas of these people, -
and not so small agendas but big hidden agendas, some plays are beig staged. (Melike-
30).
34
   
   An ―unknown‖ that legitimizes and reproduces ignorance by way of hiding 
things ―we‖ do not want to know. But, why do ―we‖ ignore? Why do ―we‖ not want to 
know? Let‘s hear İdil‘s response to these questions:  
―[…] Am I doing anything regarding these issues? (being more attentive to the 
historical and social contexts of the Kurdish and Armenian questions) No. I have 
other things in my life. Like I said... in essence these issues do not have a 
context that affect me. Maybe, if it affects me in any way, then I will realize 
some facts. If some of my privileges are taken away from me.. Maybe then, I 
                                                          
33
  ―Siz Ruslarla birleştiniz. Orada harp oluyordu ve sizin milletiniz bizlere karşı Ruslarla birlikte savaş 
verdiler. Ne yapıldı? Tehçir yapıldı. Bunu yapan tek biz değiliz, bu mecburiyetler karşısında yapılmış bir 
şey. Tamamen Türkiye'yi baskı altına almak için çeşitli sebepler bunlar.‖ 
34
 “Olduğu kanıtlanmayan birşeyi ben reddederdim, savunma mekanizması olarak herkes yapar gibi 
geliyor bana….. Bence biz Türkiye olarak yeterince güçlü olmadığımız için uluslararası arenada maşa 
olabiliyoruz. Büyük güçlerin oyunları …… güçler derken de bu artık ülkeler falan değil yani, bunlar a 
handful of people, a group of very powerful people, onların bazı ajendaları üzerinden bazı hesaplamalar -
küçük hesaplamalar değil, büyük hesaplamalar- bazı oyunlar sahneleniyor olabilir diye düşünüyorum.‖ 
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will react.. But now, I say ‗the snake that does not touch me can live a thousand 
years‘. I have to admit it, that is how it is for me at the moment. I can't lie.‖35  
  
 There is always a tendency to remember the past in terms of its significance for 
the present. This is exactly the case regarding the ―burden of Armenian memory in 
Turkey‖ (Neyzi 2010, 15). Speaking of a past suppressed in the public sphere for 
decades requires one to delve into the tricky field of agency where one has to break into 
silence, listen actively, confront and take responsibility of the past.  
 Elites‘ willful ignorance is that it is a means to sustain their power positions. 
Anything that is not directly threatening the space of positions that the elites occupy can 
be erased, dismissed, distorted or forgotten because their established privileges are 
reinforced by these habits. Ignorance, just like knowledge, produces power; power to 
construct the ―other‖ so that the distances and differences between the elite and the 
masses can better be demarcated and consequently elite positions shall be maintained. 
As Paulo Freire writes:  
―We have a strong tendency to affirm that what is different from us is inferior. 
We start from the belief that our way of being is not only good but better than 
that of others who are different from us. This is intolerance. It is the irresistible 
preference to reject differences. The dominant class, then, because it has the 
power to distinguish itself from the dominated class, first, rejects the differences 
between them but, second, does not pretend to be equal to those who are 
different; third, it does not intend that those who are different shall be equal. 
What it wants is to maintain the differences and keep its distance and to 
                                                          
35
 ―Bu konularda herhangi birşey yapıyor muyum? Hayır. Hayatımda başka şeyler var….Dediğim gibi 
aslında… temelde bana dokunan bir tarafı yok ki. Belki dokunduğunda ayılacağım bir durum olur. 
Elimdeki bazı imkanlar benden alınırsa…. Ancak o zaman tepki göstereceğim gibi geliyor. Şu anda bana 
dokunmayan yılan bin yıl yaşasın gibi bir durum var….itiraf edeyim, durum böyle….. yani şimdi yalan 
söylemeyeyim‖. 
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recognize and emphasize in practice the inferiority of those who are dominated‖ 
(1998, 71).     
 Another reason why the elites actively produce ignorance is because ―in cases 
where knowledge induces culpability or responsibility for actions, ignorance may confer 
innocence or unaccountability‖ (Smithson, 1985, 169). In other words, not-knowing is 
sometimes equal to not being accountable or responsible for any action taken or not 
taken that has political and social consequences. I argue that the unaccountability 
argument has an explanatory power in explaining the educated ignorance of the elites. 
Not knowing is an innocence claim, but not so innocent in itself because it allows the 
knower to be exempt from the consequences of actions taken. The veil of ignorance 
hides not only knowledge but also the knowers.  
3.5. Education and Ignorance: Are they really opposite concepts? 
 When we were discussing the Armenian question, Selim restlessly made a 
remarkable observation about the dependent relationship between education and our 
knowledge practices. This painful narrative highlights an urgent necessity to analyze 
and transform our educational practices and the nationalist ideology inculcated in these 
practices.       
―I think this is [the Armenian question] probably the most troubled case of the 
Republic of Turkey. And it shapes the country‘s future to a great extent. Back 
then, when we were in the university, it was troubling even to talk about it. 
Then, as far as I observed in the media, there was this stigma of traitorship, 
constantly. To talk about... I mean if we prevent talking about it by ourselves 
that much, then we multiply the possibility of only outsiders‘ talking about it by 
a hundred. Because here noone can produce ideas on it, we cannot discuss it by 
ourselves. Thus, this kind of... I think that the Republic of Turkey, by creating an 
atmosphere in which not all kinds of ideas can be discussed, has shot its own 
foot for years, and still doing the same thing. I think there‟a self-harming 
understanding here. Did it happen? (meaning the Armeniean genocide) You 
know, as far as I‘ve read.... When I read Taner Akçam... of course we were 
never aware of it, we‘ve never read anything... I mean on this subject... what on 
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earth can I comment on? Sure enough, they never taught us anything like that at 
schools. A country which doesn‘t not allow its own people‘s ideas to come into 
leaf, unfortunately, digs both its own grave and its people‘s graves. I tend to 
think that by doing so, it lays a heavy burden on the people. And this is where 
the biggest trouble lies, I mean it‘s more important than whether it actually 
happened or not... Because there are many subjects like this which cannot be 
discussed somehow
36
 (italics are mine). 
Educational institutions are considered to be one of the most effective 
apparatuses in constructing and reconstructing nationalist ideology (Altınay 2004, Bora 
2003, Copeaux 1988, Gellner 1983, Eley and Suny 1996, Hobsbawn and Ranger 2009, 
Kancı 2008, Kaplan 2008). RC and UAA is not free from this nationalizing aspect of 
education since these two institutions are obliged to follow the curricula of the Ministry 
of Education which inculcates nationalistic ideology into education. National education 
ideology, with its hegemonic character and centralizing tendencies, does not allow any 
impetus that may engender an oppositional view to the national-ness of education. The 
national educational institutions are thus the most effective apparatuses in dismissing 
any in depth inquiries into the controversial issues that are rendered to be national and 
in securing the reproduction of nationalistic ideology since the foundation years 
(Copeaux 1988; Kancı 2008; Kaplan 2008). 
                                                          
36 Bence Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin herhalde en sıkıntılı davası bu [Ermeni Meselesi]. Geleceğini de 
önemli bir ölçüde şekillendiriyor. Bu konuyu konuşmak bile çok sıkıntılıydı bizim okulda olduğumuz 
dönemlerde. Daha sonra, medyadan gözlemlediğim kadarıyla sürekli olarak bir vatan hainliği damgası. 
Bu konuyu konuşmak.. yani bir konunun konuşulmasını biz bu kadar engellersek kendi içimizde, o zaman 
tek konuşanın dışarıdan olması ihtimalini yüzle çarpıyoruz zaten. Çünkü bu konuda hiç düşünce üreten 
bir insan olmuyor, tartışamıyoruz kendi içimizde. Dolayısıyla, bu tipte… yani her türlü fikrin  
tartışılamadığı bir ortamı yaratmış olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kendi ayağına kurşun sıktı bence yıllarca ve 
devam da ediyor bu. Kendi kendisine zarar veren bir anlayış var burada diye düşünüyorum.  Var mıydı? 
(Ermeni soykırımı için soruyor)  Yani benim de okuyabildiğim kadarıyla… Taner Akçam'ı okuduğum 
zaman….. tabii ki hiçbir zaman farkında değildik ki biz, hiçbir şey okumadık ki biz…. yani bu konuda…. 
ne konuda yorum yapabilirim ki ben? Hakikaten bize okulda hiç böyle birşey anlatılmadı. Kendi 
insanının fikirlerinin yeşermesine izin vermeyen bir devlet, ne yazık ki kendi kuyusunu kazıyor ve o 
insanların da kuyusunu kazıyor. Çok büyük bir yük yüklüyor insanların üstüne diye düşünüyorum. En 
büyük sıkıntı orada yani olup olmamasından daha önemli….. çünkü buna benzer bir sürü konu var 
konuşulamayan bir türlü.  
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Given this imperfection that the nationalist education has produced in our 
learning practices, Selim finds it hard to cope with the new information he obtained 
about the Armenian question simply because we are not taught to critically deal with 
heavily loaded concepts but on the contrary, our education ―functions as an instrument 
which is used to facilitate integration of the younger generation into the logic of the 
present system and bring about conformity‖ (Freire, 1987). Willful ignorance of the 
elites, I think, is closely related to this non-critical, non-reflexive and non-
transformative function of education which Theodor Adorno calls half-education 
(halbbildung). 
 Tanıl Bora, in his article ―Tahsilli Cehaletin Cinneti‖ (The Lunacy of 
Educated Ignorance) refers to Adorno‘s half-education theory and correlates the 
development of half-education to the economic crisis. When social conditions 
deteriorate and economic differences become more marked, it is difficult to promise a 
liberal education.  For Adorno, education is free and dynamic. It is not instrumentalized 
or fixed towards any goal. Lack of education is pure naiveness, pure not knowing; 
hereby it allows for an unmediated relationship with the objects. Therefore, it provides a 
starting point where the education can be started. As for half- education, it does not 
precede education, but follows it; it has been fixed and instrumentalized by being tied to 
a cultural or social goal. What is half-understood or half-learned is not the fore step of 
education but its mortal enemy (Bora 2006). 
 
If comprehensive education reflects the idea of developing merely the practical 
and technical capacities of individuals, providing the kinds of cultural experiences 
which foster the desire to think critically, then behind half-education lies the desire to 
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divide up culture and teach only aspects of it. ―Half-education is which is left when the 
conditions of autonomy are neglected and integration and conformity become the 
central focus‖ (Maddock, 1998, 6). Education, then, is reduced to fostering conformity 
and suppresses the capacity for reflection.  
It is intellectualism (related to half-education) and anti-intellectualism (related to 
non-education) that destroys the capacity for reflection and judgment. Half-education 
does not reject the intellectual, but it strips the intellectual of his/her critical and 
reflective potential. Education encourages individuals to imagine that they are members 
of a higher, more comprehensive world. It provides the credentials which allows one to 
have a say, however restricted, to act like an expert, to support, to belong. Education is a 
means of integration. The feeling of belonging, however false it might actually be, frees 
individuals from the need to question, this is the true telos of half-education (Bora, 
2006, 38-40).   
Maybe, it is not the ignorance of the masses but the ignorance of the elites that 
we should attentive to; willful ignorance does not grasp the unity but works rather upon 
divided particulars, separate phenomena and partial relations. It is a power that divides 
rather than unites, it seeks out conformity rather than autonomy. As Paulo Freire says, 
"For apart from inquiry, apart from the praxis, individuals cannot be truly human. 
Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, 
impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the 
world, and with each other" and true education is ―the practice of freedom, the means by 
which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to 
participate in the transformation of their world."  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONTESTED MEANINGS: TURKISH ELITE’S SECULAR IDENTITY, RISE 
OF ISLAMISM AND POLITICS OF ANXIETY & SECURITY 
 
 
 
I think at the moment lots of things are going very 
wrong. I think they are going very, very wrong. In 
Turkey, there are fears that are really alive, fears 
that are kept alive. You know... What we call 
anxiety is something else: It is a state of mind in 
which, in the future you will be able exist or not 
(Seher-60).
37
 
 
 
 
With the inception of the new Radikal newspaper into the Turkish media in 
2010, the readers have been introduced to a newly shaped discussion on the middle and 
upper-middle classes of Turkey. The discussion was initiated by the chief editor of the 
new Radikal Eyüp Can, who presented the new columnist of the paper and political 
scientist Binnaz Toprak as an anxious modern (endişeli modern). Toprak‘s latest 
research titled Being Different in Turkey: Religion, Conservatism and Otherization was 
amply discussed in Turkey in 2009 when it first came out. The research embodied the 
concept of ―neighborhood pressure‖ introduced by Şerif Mardin. This concept was 
quickly picked up by a wide range of political parties and intellectuals to define a 
particular kind of discrimination taking place in Turkey. The purpose of the research 
was to examine the relationship between religiosity and conservatism in order to 
determine whether persons with different identities or preferences in Anatolian cities 
were faced with repression and ―otherization‖ related to religion and conservatism 
(Toprak, Bozan, Morgül and Şener 2009). In other words, the research focused on the 
question if those with secular identities faced social pressure and concluded that they 
                                                          
37
 ―Ben şu anda çok şeyin çok kötü gittiğini düşünüyorum. Çok çok kötü gittiğini düşünüyorum. 
Türkiye'de gerçekten yaşanan, yaşatılan bazı korkular var….. biliyorsun. Endişe dediğin olay başkadır; o, 
kafanın içinde ilerde yaşayıp yaşayamayacağın yerdir.‖ 
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did face social pressure. Binnaz Toprak and her colleagues were then accused of using 
incorrect methodological techniques in their investigation and some regarded the 
research to be invalid.
38
 Since then, regardless of her previous studies which 
concentrated on discrimination based on religious belief and practices
39
, Binnaz Toprak 
was mostly regarded as voicing the anxieties of the secular segment of the society.     
The term ―anxious modern‖ was first introduced by Tarhan Erdem who is also a 
columnist of Radikal and the founder of KONDA Research and Consultancy Firm 
which conducts surveys on political and social life in Turkey. On 10 September 2009, 
Erdem introduced and defined the term ―anxious modern‖ in his column. According to 
him, approximately 10% of Turkish people constitutes of what he refers to as "anxious 
moderns". Basing his claims on the surveys he conducted, he asserted that the most 
important republican value of anxious moderns is secularism which engenders a 
categorical opposition to AKP and its policies. 
40
  
Later, in an interview, basing his observations on The Constitutional 
Referendum Survey that his firm had conducted before the referendum on 12 September 
2010, Erdem claimed that 10 % of those who voted against the constitutional 
amendments were the ―anxious moderns‖. ―The anxious moderns believe that AKP 
wants to impose a system based on religious rules. In 2002, this was only a suspicion 
[…] Frankly, I had such a suspicion back then, but now this suspicion among the 
anxious moderns, let alone decreasing, became a conviction. They do not argue whether 
it is like this or like that. "AKP will bring the shariah rule, full stop. It will turn Turkey 
into Iran. Full stop […] I think we should call them "determined cowards" from now 
                                                          
38
 Etyen Mahçupyan, ―Hangi Mahalle Baskısı‖, Taraf, 26.12.2008    
39
 See Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1981; Binnaz 
Toprak, ―Islam and Democracy in Turkey‖, Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2005, 167-87. 
40
 Tarhan Erdem, ―Ceza‖, Radikal, 10.09.2009 
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on.‖41 Thus, in the view of Tarhan Erdem, within one year, the ―anxious moderns‖ had 
been transferred from being anxious to being fearful, from skeptics to cowards. To put it 
differently, ―anxious moderns‖, according to Erdem, had moved along a line which was 
initially guided by reason but later –as AKP secured its place as the one and only 
political actor in Turkish political realm- rationality was replaced by futile and irrational 
feelings which engendered incompetence to discern the democratic achievements of 
AKP.       
Moving along the same vein, the term ―anxious modern‖ was immediately 
adopted by Binnaz Toprak and her first article in her new column was titled as ―Why am 
I anxious?‖ Her definition of the term was quite different from Erdem‘s. Hers implied 
that she was in no way categorically in opposition with AKP, or living with the fear that 
Turkey may turn into a country like Iran. On the contrary, she praised the performance 
of AKP on certain political issues. Why, then, was Toprak anxious? 
―I am anxious because democracy is being used for  populism and domination of 
the majority, while the minorities are marginalized. I am anxious because those 
who criticize the government are labeled as pro-coup d'etatist, pro-militarist, 
nationalist, secularist and these labelings silence the critical mind. This process 
of silencing the oppositional voices do not support the idea of democratization 
for me. […]. AKP is likely to rule Turkey by itself or through coalitons for a 
long time and I find its discourse of democratization troublesome. It is drawing 
the developing democratization process to a populistic line. This discourse 
which hails public support and puts majority's votes in the center of democracy's 
definition, is hiding our democracy's "illiberal" dimensions. As Eyüp Can 
phrases it, the impression that AKP has on "the anxious moderns" like myself is 
that we are against a power that is willing to use its executive and legislative 
power to the very end. ‖42 
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 Neşe Düzel, Interview with Tarhan Erdem, Taraf, 20.09.2010 
42
 Binnaz Toprak, ―Neden Endişeliyim?‖ Radikal, 17.10.2010 
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This dissident voice of Toprak is echoed by the Turkish elites that I have 
interviewed all of whom are anxious about Turkey‘s future. Unlike Tarhan Erdem and 
similar to Toprak, they do not regard this anxiety as an impertinent or irrational feeling 
but as an essential state of somehow restless alertness against the allegedly undesirable 
effects of the in-and-still rising power of AKP as the conservative governing party. The 
Turkish elites are constituted of the so-called ―anxious moderns‖ whose political and 
social standing is antagonistic to conservatism and religious ideologies which they 
believe to be crystallized in the mentality of AKP.
43
  
In this respect, Turkish elites believe that AKP‘s increasing and deepening 
power is a threat to the secular structure of the state because of the belief that AKP has 
―hidden agendas‖ to change the secular character of the state ―when the times are ripe‖. 
The elites‘ insecurities and anxieties about Turkey‘s future focus basically on 
secularism which is a central tenet in Turkish political and social life. The danger is the 
rise of Islamism which is ―construed and presented as the most major threat to the 
integrity of the state in Turkey‖ (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 7).  
The post-Cold War world is partly characterized by the demand for political 
recognition of the Islamic identities and the crisis of multiculturalism. The resurgence of 
religious movements has caused –and is still causing- anxiety not only in Turkey but 
also in the world. During the 1990s, the post-Cold War world has frequently witnessed 
the emergence of varying claims to religious identity and politics which in the 
beginning of the millennium reached its peak with what is now known as the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the USA causing thousands of casualties, and bringing about human 
                                                          
43
 The examination of the mentality, ideology and structure of AKP as a political party is beyond the 
scope of this research. See İlhan Özgel and Bülent Duru (eds), AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün 
Bilançosu,2009 and Nuh Yılmaz ―İslamcılık, AKP, Siyaset‖, 2005 for detailed inquiries into AKP.  
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misery and tragedy (Keyman 2007). The recent developments in many European states, 
such as the headscarf debate in France (Göle 2010, Scott 2007), the increasing 
intolerance and discrimination against different religious identities in Germany and 
Netherlands
44
 similarly informs the ambiguity and ambivalence embedded in the 
connection between religion and secular European modernity (Keyman 2007).       
All these recent developments have invigorated the view that Muslim societies, 
due to the alleged anti-modern and fossilized nature of the Islamic tradition, are 
incapable of adapting to modern values, secularism in particular (Hashemi 2010). The 
idea that Islam is incompatible with secularism as the main feature of European 
modernity has fed upon the anxieties and fears of the secular identities
45
 and stimulated 
the view that secular European modernity has to be protected against the rise of 
Islamism.  In return, religion has responded to the challenge of secularism with a 
vigorous defense of its appropriate role as an essential player in public life. 
Another outcome of the latest developments concerning the connection between 
religion and secularism is the conviction among some scholars that the classical 
―secularization thesis‖ is challenged (Gülalp 2002; Keddie 1997, 2003; Taylor 2010). 
The scholarly literature that informs the connection between religion and secularism has 
generated new readings of secularism which have posed a great challenge to the 
traditional secularism thesis and paved the way for what we may call post-secularism. 
―The secularization thesis is a research program with, at its core an explanatory model 
which asserts that the social significance of religion diminishes in response to the 
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 See the report ―Addressing Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims: Education and Youth‖, 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/39017. 
45
 Secular identities are the ―laikler‖ of Turkey. Secularism in Turkey defines not only a ―regime‖ but also 
idividual people. I understand ―secular identity‖ as a cultural and political identity in the making. 
―Laikçi‖, secularist is also a term used to define this identity. See Navaro Yashin, 2002.     
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operation of modernization‖ (Keddie 1997). In other words, the secularization thesis 
emphasizes a linear progressive viewpoint of modernization:  the more modernized a 
society is, the more secular it becomes, hence the decline of religiosity.  The challenge 
of the secularization thesis is, however, in explaining why religion did not go away.      
An alternative to the secularization thesis came from Charles Taylor who 
―engages a complex reading of the interconnections and re-compositions of the 
religious-secular divide that ends up, according to him, by their mutual fragilization in 
the present stage‖ (Göle 2010). Taylor refrains from the dualistic and simplistic thesis 
of opposition between religion and secularism and rejects the linearity and universality 
of the secularization thesis.  Briefly put, basing his arguments on Western 
modernization, Taylor states that a) modern secularization does not necessarily result in 
a decline in religiosity and b) rather than conceptualizing and situating the secular 
European modernity as a universal given, he problematizes European modernity and 
secularism as ―ideal‖ and universal‖ types. In search of a democratic reconciliation 
between secular and non-secular identities in the Western context, Taylor adopts a view 
of secularism without negating it to religion and aims to comprehend multiple 
modernities rather than a singular view of an all-encompassing modernity.  
After historicizing and defining secularism in Turkey, this chapter, in the light of 
the aforementioned views, attempts to examine a) the construction of the secular elite 
identity, b) the nationalistic discourses that inspire or are supported by this identity, c) 
how the notions of identity and nationalistic discourses frame the context of debates 
(e.g. headscarf debate) in contemporary Turkey.   
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4.1. The Multiple Histories of Secularism: How to Define Secularism? 
Secularism is a complex concept the meaning of which is deeply contested 
(Keddie 2003; Taylor 2010).  The ambiguity of the concept is ingrained in the two 
different dominant models of secularism that have been bequeathed to us from Euro-
American tradition of political thought. These models are Anglo-American secularism 
and French secularism or laicism (Hashemi 2010, Kuzu 2007, Taylor 2010). These 
different models have evolved under different historical circumstances which entailed 
the formation of different secularisms. As Nader Hashemi writes, ―the different histories 
of political secularism are a by-product of the unique political experiences and debates 
over the relationship between religion and state and controversies over the role of 
religion in emerging democracies‖ (2010, 328). Similarly, Ahmet Kuzu argues that 
secularism cannot be studied outside the contexts of historical conditions and 
ideological struggles that determine the mode of secularism a state adopts during the 
state building process (2007). 
 The difference between these two models of secularism mentioned above is 
based on whether the state policies toward public visibility of religion are inclusionary 
or exclusionary. Anglo-American model which pursues inclusionary state policies 
experiences ―passive secularism‖ which ―requires that the secular state play a passive 
role in avoiding the establishment of any religions, allows for the public visibility of 
religion‖ (Kuzu 2007, 571). The French model, on the other hand, experiences 
―assertive secularism‖ which ―means that the state excludes religion from the public 
sphere and plays an assertive role as the agent of a social engineering process that 
confines religion to private domain‖ (ibid.).46  What determines the mode of secularism 
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 See Charles Taylor, ―Modes of Secularism‖ in Secularism and its Critics, ed. by Rajeev Bhargava, 
1998.  
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a state enforces, therefore, is dependent upon the historical conditions and ideological 
struggles during the nation building process. In the light of this fact, we can define 
secularism as follows:    
 Nikki Keddie has listed three ways in which secularization is commonly 
understood today: (1) ―an increase in the number of people with secular beliefs and 
practices‖; (2) ―a lessening of religious control or influence over major spheres of life‖, 
and (3) ―a growth in state separation from religion and in secular regulation of formerly 
religious institutions and customs‖ (2003, 16).  
Similarly, José Casanova adopts a tripartite categorization of secularism. He 
makes a distinction between ―secularization as differentiation of the secular spheres 
from religious institutions and norms, secularization as decline of religious beliefs and 
practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere‖ 
(quoted in Hashemi 2010, 327).   
Finally, in more recent intervention, Charles Taylor -providing similar 
definitions of secularism to those mentioned above- has argued that secularism is not a 
bulwark to religion or public visibility of religious identities. He writes ―one of our 
basic problems in dealing with … problems is that we have the wrong model, which has 
a continuing in our minds. We think that secularism (or laicité) has to do with the 
relation of the state and religion, whereas in fact it has to do with the (correct) response 
of the democratic state to diversity‖ (2010, 25). In this respect, he favors a secular 
regime which is neutral to religious or non-religious viewpoints. For him, ―the pluralism 
of society requires that there be some kind of neutrality, or ‗principled distance‘ to use 
Rajeev Bhargava‘s term‖ (2010, 23).  The point of ―principled distance‖ of the state is 
precisely to avoid favoring or disfavoring not just religious positions, but any basic 
position, religious or non-religious. 
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All these discussions remind me of one of my interviewees who was quite 
concerned about whether people around her would keep a ―principled distance‖ if she 
disclosed her stance as an agnostic. Defining herself as a non-religious person, she had 
kept her long and contemplative journey toward agnosticism secret because of the fear 
that she might have been marginalized. The significance of Taylor‘s intervention to the 
debate on secularism is striking not only from the point of view of religious identities -
who seem to be discussed more in Turkey- but also from the point of view of non-
religious identities.  
My analysis of secularism in Turkey will thus be situated within the framework 
of a pluralistic understanding which appreciates diversity, and which problematizes both 
assertive secularism and its fetishization. This approach neither questions that certain 
practices of political Islam may embody possible threats to secularism, nor renders these 
possibilities less ―real‖, but in an attempt to inquire into the secularist mentality of the 
elites, this approach aims to examine how the secular identities manifest themselves in 
social relations in contemporary Turkey. It is about scrutinizing meanings attached to 
and feelings associated with secularism by the secularist elites, and exploring the 
implications of these current meanings and feelings. 
4.2. Situating Secularism in Turkey
47
: The Historical Legacy of Atatürk 
After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and his colleagues, the rapid process of secularization began with the 
abolishment of the caliphate in 1924. This act was the first attempt to mark a sharp 
difference between the religious state of the Ottoman Empire and the secular state of the 
Turkish Republic. Other secularizing reforms continued: in 1925, the religious shrines 
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 I agree with Davison (2003) that the practice of secularism in Turkey is better understood with the 
concept of laicism than with the concept of secularism. Nevertheless, in order not to complicate the 
narrative, I have chosen to use ‗secularism‘ in reference to Turkey‘s laiklik.    
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(türbe) and dervish convents (tekke) were closed down, and in a symbolic act that 
epitomized the breaking of links with the Ottoman past, the fez, a must wear accessory 
for all adult Muslim men in the country was declared illegal. A new law required all 
men to wear western-style hats.   
In 1926, the Sharia and the medrese system (traditional schools where the basis 
of instruction was religion) were abolished and the European calendar was adopted. The 
Swiss Civil Code that regulates matters of marriage, inheritance, divorce etc. was 
introduced in the same year. In 1928, with abolishment of the Arabic alphabet, the Latin 
alphabet and script was adopted. In 1936 the Muslim Sabbath, Friday, was dropped in 
favor of Sunday. Henceforth, Saturday and Sunday would be the weekend according to 
the new calendar. Secularism became a principle of Turkish constitution in 1937. With 
all these reforms, secularization pushed the Islamic faith out of the public domain and 
marked a major rupture with the Ottoman past (Ahmad 2003, 2005; Zürcher 2007).48 
Turkish secularism has a distinctive characteristic that separates it from Western 
models. ―Secular reforms in Turkey never aimed at complete separation of religion and 
state, as Islam was put under the straight control of through the establishment of  
Diyanet” (General Directorate of Religious Affairs) (Gürbey 2009, 314). Accordingly, 
―Islam was not disestablished: it was differently established‖ (Davison 2003, 341).  
Through the Diyanet ―the state produces knowledge about a particular conception of 
Islam as a part of the project of nation-making, hence exercising a theological function‖ 
(Gürbey 2009, 314). Turkish secularism puts religion into the domain of the secular by 
the establishment of Diyanet as an apparatus that embraces the policy of providing 
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 This is not to suggest that secularization attempts were initiated with the establishment of the Republic. 
On the contrary, the modernization/westernization projects of the Ottoman Empire included a secularist 
vein. See Ahmad 2003, 2005; Zürcher 2007; Kushner 1977; Lewis 2002; Mardin 1962; Karpat 2008; 
Hanioğlu 1995, 2001 for documentations of the secularization attempts of the late Ottoman Empire.  
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Muslims the ―true knowledge‖ of Islam. Islam, then, becomes the ―national‖ religion of 
the modern Turkish nation which employs a particular conception of religion that is in 
line with the goal of westernization/modernization. ―The state control of religion was 
needed in order to attain the goal of elevating Turkey to the level of contemporary 
civilization, i.e. westernization. Hence, secularism not only became a set of policies 
leading to state control of religion buıt also ensured that Islam would not get in the way 
of the larger goal of westernization‖ (Kadığlu 2010, 494).     
The nation building process of the Turkish Republic was largely characterized 
by ―a singular and unitary definition of Turkism that was based on a radical break from 
the former religious definition‖ (Yıldız 2001, 139). Secularization was the project that 
informed the construction of Turkish national identity. In this respect, secularism ―did 
not accompany modernization, but, rather, became a project in order to realize the goal 
of becoming western‖ (Kadıoğlu 2010, 490). This point is crucial, because elites‘ 
perception of the status of secularism in Turkey today, is largely assessed by whether 
the goal of ―becoming western‖ has been achieved or not. For them, like the Kemalist 
elites in the formation years of the Republic, becoming western/modern have two 
unconditional prerequisites: having a secular identity and believing in the principles of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, that is being/becoming Ataturkists.  They think that those who 
pursue another route by way of an affiliation to construct politically religious identities 
as opposed to the secular identities depart from the path of modernization.  
In the eyes of the Turkish elites, just like it was in eyes of the Republican elites, 
secularization is a project to fulfill the goal of modernization and Westernization 
(Kadıoğlu 2010). Back in the foundation years, secularization was a top-down, 
constructed and tightly controlled project. Today, according to the Turkish elites, it has 
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to be reconstructed in the same way it was constructed before, and should be kept under 
strict control because the project has not been fulfilled yet. The challenge of Turkish 
secularization project, from the beginning, is in articulating secular subjectivities that 
are very much caught up in the discourses of modernization, Westernization and 
nationalism. Turkish secularism is entrapped in an amalgam of these discourses that fail 
to accommodate religious identities and thus turns into an exclusivist, assertive 
discourse. Consequently, secularism in Turkey becomes the management of the fear of 
religion and the religious. I argue that in contemporary Turkey, secularist discourses are 
closely related to and intertwined with certain nationalist discourses. In order to 
understand the discursive field in which Turkish secularism realizes itself and by taking 
the headscarf debate as a reference point, I will attempt to inquire into the emerging 
nationalism(s) that Turkish elites are inclined to internalize and/or idealize.  
4.3. Secularism and Nationalism Alarmed 
There are two kinds of fears that the secular elites experience in contemporary 
Turkey. The first kind of fear stems from the ―outsiders‖, those who are not in the 
circles of the elites. It is the fear of the possibility of a forced change of elite life-styles. 
The power that AKP as the governing conservative party employs and the fact that the 
majority of the people in Turkey vote for AKP construct the fear that the western and 
secular life-style is under threat (see the discussion below). The second type of fear 
stems from the ―insiders‖: those who are believed to be ―one of us‖, who have a western 
and secular life-style, those who have been educated in elite circles and those who have 
an elite habitus. What generates fear in the case of the ―insiders‖ is the possibility that 
these ―insiders‖ may ―betray‖ the defining principles of Ataturkism which operates as a 
very effective symbolic power in elite circles.  
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An example of betrayal can be illustrated in the case of the last film Mustafa that 
journalist and writer Can Dündar shot. The depiction of Atatürk in this film, that he is a 
smoker, he was fond of women and he drank too much, is believed to harm the image of 
Atatürk in these ―uncanny‖ times. Both the film and the film-maker are perceived to be 
―disloyal‖ to Atatürk as a symbol and cult figure.      
―Atatürk wasn't someone we are impressed by for his private life. You know, he 
saved the country. He was a successful commander. Then again, he founded the 
republic, it was a great revolution. He guided us forward, towards çağdaşlık (up-
to-dateness), towards the west. I don't see anything to niggle in it. Why should I 
meddle into his private life? Why should it be the subject of films? Whether he 
drank or not, whether he smoked or not? Why should I concern myself with it? 
Whether he was too fond of women or not? I am not interested in these aspects 
of him... I mean, if they want to talk about it, let them talk. But it is not a proper 
subject for me to talk about. Why do people try to dishonor him like that, what 
has it got to do with it?‖49 (Gülsen)50    
Similarly, İpek (31) argues that ―because this film was shot by somebody who was 
perceived to be an Ataturkist‖, the whole issue of defending and protecting the values of 
the Republic becomes even more urgent‖. The sense of urgency is fueled by the 
perception that ―insiders‖ are gradually becoming ―outsiders‖ and betraying the basic 
principles of what is regarded as ―sacred‖ and ―valuable‖, the principles of Ataturkist 
nationalism.  Liberal democrat journalists who support AKP‘s efforts to bring to the 
center the traditionally invisible periphery –that is, Kurds and Islamists- are also 
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 It is worth noting the similarity of this Ataturkist argument with the Islamist argument raised against 
the recent TV series Muhteşem Yüzyıl (The Magnificient Century)the director and the script-writer of 
which is being accused of ―inappropriately‖ depicting the private life of Süleyman the Magnificient.     
50
 ―Atatürk bizi özel hayatıyla etkileyen bir adam değildi ki. Ne bileyim, memleketi kurtardı. Kumandan 
olarak başarılı bir adamdı. Sonra cumhuriyeti kurdu, büyük bir devrimdi. İleriye,  çağdaşlığa doğru, 
batıya doğru bir yön gösterdi. Şimdi bunların irdelenecek bir tarafını görmüyorum. Şahsi hayatina niye 
beni karisayim? Niçin filmlere konu oluyor? Yok içermis, içmezmis, sigara içermis, içmezmis. Beni ne 
alakadar ediyor? Kadınlara düşkünmüs, degilmis. Beni ne alakadar ediyor? Ben bu yönüyle meşgul 
degilim ki Atatürk'ün….. Buyurulsun, konuşulsun, yani isteyen konuşur ama benim konuşacağim bir 
konu degil. Niçin bu tip konularla Atatürk'e leke sürülmeye kalkiliyor, ne alakasi var?‖ 
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perceived as ―inside outsiders‖ and ―traitors‖. Ahmet Altan the chief editor of Taraf 
newspaper, and most of Taraf columnists are accused of ―digging Turkey‘s grave‖ 
(Dilek-60) by supporting AKP and its policies.   
To sum up, either because of the ―outsiders‖ or the ―inside outsiders‖, or both, 
secularism is perceived to be under threat. The sustainability of the secularist structure 
of the state becomes a security issue from the perspective of the elites. The 
―securityness of secularism‖, as Pınar Bilgin (2008) phrases it, is the main source of 
anxiety of the elites I have interviewed. This deeply rooted anxiety shapes the political 
and social standing of the elites all of whom define themselves as having secular 
identities. I have observed that elites‘ perception of threat against secularism manifests 
itself as ―discourses of danger‘ – the set of validity claims through which someone or 
something is represented as under threat or in need of safeguarding‖ (Bilgin, 2008, 
594). Taking secularism as a security referent ―rests upon the premise that danger is not 
an objective condition but is socially constructed‖ (ibid.). Studying the insecurity and 
anxiety of the elites, therefore, implies an examination of the social construction of the 
―discourses of danger‖ they tend to (re)produce.  
4.4. The Headscarf Debate 
The stipulation on dress codes in Turkey bans women from veiling in 
universities and public places. The women who demand to be admitted to universities 
with headscarves argue that it is a basic civil liberty whereas the higher courts of the 
Turkish state that issued the ban argued that 1) veiling restricted women‘s liberties, 2) it 
was a symbol of opposition to the Republic, 3) it would lead to unequal treatment and 4) 
veiling implied the threat of organizing the sate according to the dictates of Islam (Arat, 
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2001).  Over the past three decades, Turkey has witnessed heated debates about the 
acceptability of the veil in public institutions.  
The headscarf debate has been the defining marker of secular/anti-secular 
polarization in Turkey. Veiling and what it symbolizes is the negation of the being, life, 
presence and identity of the secular elites. It is the ―other‖ of the symbolic power -that is 
Ataturkist nationalism- the elites construct their secular identities upon. Veiling as a 
symbol is perceived to be the end of a modern and secular social imaginary. It is a 
catastrophe, the worst thing that can happen to Turkey as Özkan (69) anxiously 
prophesizes while negating the symbolism of veiling to his identity ―I am a secular 
person. I believe hundred percent in it, thousand percent… I think that otherwise, it will 
be Turkey's disaster, thus may come the civil war, thus and so may it come only‖. As 
Casanova asserts headscarf debate ―certainly was perceived as a blasphemous affront 
against the secularist constitutional principles of the state‖ (quoted in Keyman 2007, 
227).   
4.5. Muslim identity versus Islamist identity: The Construction of “Turkish Islam” 
 One of the arguments posed by the elites in defense of secularism focused on 
what kind of an identity veiling represents and to what extent this identity is acceptable 
by the norms of Turkish secularism. Özkan (69) who has a religious as well as a secular 
individuality explains the difference of a Muslim and Islamic identity as follows:  
 ―I am a religious man. I never leave home without completing my morning 
prayers, never. I used to go to Friday prayers in the past, tried not to miss it. 
Once, many years ago, during the Cyprus war, at Rüstem Paşa Mosque, a man 
came up for the sermon and he said ―our topic today is the war‖. I don't forget, I 
was contemplating he would talk about unity, togetherness, forgetting about old 
separations. I heard him saying "your real enemies are the Mustafas and 
Ismets"…. I left, I could not argue against him there but I could not endure that 
either. It was a very difficult experience for me. I do not go to mosques after 
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that. I know, I have to go but I don't. I do not want to experience something like 
that once more, but other than that, I am a religious person. For me, it is not 
Islam being practiced in most of Turkey but it is Islamism. It is to achieve 
economic gain using religion.  If I am praying, if I am going to pilgrimage, these 
are not against secularism. These are the conditions of Islam. Nobody can say I 
am an Islamist because I do these. The real people, the real people of faith do 
these and do not boast about it‖. 51   
The differentiation of Özkan between the religious and ―pseudo-religious‖ identities is 
based upon the Republican assertion that religion is a private matter, hence should be 
kept in private domains of life. In public places, as well as in mosques, if religion and 
religious identities are politicized and/or publicized, secular norms are endangered. This 
view entails a dividing line between a Muslim identity and an Islamist identity. The 
former expresses a religious identity whereas the latter refers to a social movement that 
through which Muslim identity is collectively re-appropriated as a basis for an 
alternative social and political project (Göle 2002).  The Muslim identity is perceived to 
be in harmony with the secular norms whereas the Islamic identity is a ―swaggering‖ 
identity that embodies potential threats to secularism.   
 A similar argumentation on the differentiation of identities is presented also by 
Filiz (49) who is exceptionally pessimistic about Turkey‘s future. She fears for herself 
and the Jewish community she belongs to and regards that the recent developments in 
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 ―Ben dindar bir adamım. Sabah namaz kılmadan evimden çıkmam. Hiç böyle birşey baki değil…. 
eskiden Cuma namazına da giderdim, onu da kaçırmazdım ama bu Rüstem Paşa Camii‘nde, vaktiyle çok 
sene evvel, Kıbrıs Harbi sırasında, bir Cuma namazına gittim. Hutbeye bir adam çıktı, ―konumuz savaş‖ 
dedi. Ben de  unutmuyorum… içimden geçen… yani bu savaşta artık ayrılıkları unutalım…. birlik, 
beraberlik  diye söyler, diye düşünürken…… "senin asıl düşmanların Mustafalardır, İsmetlerdir" diye 
hutbeden o adamın lafını duydum ben ve çıktım çünkü karşı çıkamazdım orada…. ama ona da tahammül 
etmek mümkün değildi. Bana çok ağır geldi. Çıktım oradan, çıktım… ondan sonrada camiiye 
gitmiyorum, camiiye gitmiyorum. Gitmem lazım, onu da biliyorum ama gitmiyorum. Bir daha böyle 
birşeye muhattap olmak istemiyorum…. ama onun dışında dindar bir insanım. Bence Türkiye'nin büyük 
bir kısmında yapılan din değildir, dinciliktir. Yapılan dini kullanarak ekonomik rant sağlamaktır. Şunlar 
laikliğe aykırı değildir: ben namaz kılıyorsam, ben Hacca gidiyorsam, bunlar laiklik karşıtı değil….ya 
bunlar Müslümanlığın icabı zaten…. bunu yapıyorum diye kimse beni dinci falan saymasın. Zaten doğru 
dürüst adamlar, doğru dürüst riayet edenler bunları yapıyorlar ve bunların fiyakasını yapmıyorlar.‖  
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Turkey embody an immense threat to both the current secular regime and Atatürkist 
nationalism. For her, the Muslim identity had a ―balancing power‖ in Turkey for those 
who are non-Muslim. ―The Republican and Turkish interpretation of Islam‖ had been in 
compliance with other religions and religious identities living in Turkey whereas the 
Islamic identity –promoted by AKP- has an ―imperious‖ character that has the potential 
to harm non-Muslim communities, Jews in particular.  
―I am Jewish. I am a Turk. And I am very happy of being a Turk....... Let me 
say, it was my first awakening to not being accepted as much as a Turk in 
Turkey, despite my feeling as a Turk. Being aware of the conditions that Jews 
have gone through in history, I do not want to stay in a place where I am not 
wanted as a Jew. I do not want to go. This is where I was born. This is where all 
the people I have know all my life are. This is where all my values come from. 
Today, it is the religious aspect being questioned. It is not that religion did not 
exist here before, or people had difficulty in practising their faith. Everybody 
practised what they wanted but his was what defined you. I feel there is a more 
hardcore Arabic type of Islam being imposed. This is what I interpret from what 
I see. Arabic type of Islam fosters Jewish hatred, so much as to saying "it is a 
right to kill a Jew" in the interpretations of the religious book.‖52 
 
The above argumentations of a secular Muslim Turk (Özkan) and a secular 
Jewish Turk (Filiz) depart from different contexts but arrive at a similar conclusion 
which questions the use and abuse of religion. Secularism, for both, is a means to 
protect their being, presence, and life-styles which are allegedly endangered by the 
emergence of Islamist identities as opposed to Muslim identities who tend to regard 
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 ―Yahudiyim. Türküm. Türklüğümden de son derece mutluyum…………. Benim kendimi Türk 
hissettiğim kadar, Türkiye'de o derecede Türk kabul edilmiyor olabileceğime uyanıyorum. Yahudilerin 
tarih içinde  yaşamak durumunda kaldıkları olayları da bilince, ben bir Yahudi olarak istenmediğim yerde 
kalmamaktan yanayım. Gitmek istemiyorum, burası benim doğduğum yer. Bütün çevremin olduğu yer. 
Bütün değerlerimin örtüştüğü yer. Bugün, din boyutu çok körükleniyor. Eskiden burada din yok değildi 
ki, eskiden burada insanlar dini vecibelerini yerine getirmekte bir sıkıntı mı yaşıyordu? Herkes ne 
istiyorsa yapıyordu ama bu ön kimlik olarak ortaya çıkan birşey değildi. Bugün daha Arap tarzı bir 
Müslümanlık damardan verilmeye çalışılıyor gibi bir hissim var benim. Gördüğümü öyle yorumluyorum. 
Arap tarzı Müslümanlık Yahudi düşmanlığını körükleyen bir tarzdır ve dini kitabın yorumlamalarında da 
-Yahudi öldürmek haktır‘a kadar giden, öyle yorumlanan taraflar vardır.‖ 
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religion as a non-political and private matter. Religious identities, for both, should be 
aligned to the norms of Turkish secularism. In this sense, secularism is the defining 
principle that organizes life and the chief principle of Ataturkist nationalism which 
emerged in the 1990s as a secular reaction to the rise of Islamism is secularism (Bora 
2003) In this nationalist discourse, secularism has been modified and codified with an 
effort to ―nationalize‖ the religion. With the attempt to align religion to the secular 
norms of Ataturkist nationalism, a ―Turkish Islam‖ was created (Bora 2003, 440), the 
Turkishness of which is construed as the public identity and Islamic as the private 
identity. ―Turkish Islam‖ conceptualization is not only hostile to public representations 
of Islamist identities but also ―expresses its opposition to the Arabs which Ataturkist 
nationalism reduces to a symbol of political Islam‖ (439). The ―Arab-like‖ religiosity as 
opposed to ―Turkish Islam‖ is disparaged and disliked (Serap-58, Melike 30) and 
perceived to have nothing in common with the concept of Turkishness embedded in 
Ataturkist nationalism (Esra-25).   
4.6. Veiling: A Symbol of Piety or Politics? 
Elite discourses of danger are constructed around the axis of the reconstitution, 
reformulation and construction of Islamist life practices the secular speculations of 
which are the use of public space across gender and wearing of Islamist headscarf 
(Navaro-Yashin 2002).  Veiling for all elites is a symbol of politics, sincerity of which 
can be questioned. 
―Headscarf is a political symbol. It can not be considered within the context of 
religious freedom. I do not believe in its sincerity. Our people in Anatolia is 
covered. Go to the villages, women are covered. Nobody has anything against 
that kind of covering, we do not find it strange.  […] Because I am  a deeply 
secular person, deeply believing in secularism and I have no interest in 
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headscarves, religions, I do not want to see people with headscarves in the 
universities‖. (Gülsen-69).53 
 
 The politicization of Islamic headscarf is what triggers the emergence of mistrust 
towards the Islamist identities. Veiling is perceived as an Islamist uprising and an 
Islamist definition of self as opposed to the ―Anatolian style of covering‖ which is not 
appropriated as a political symbol but a disinterested one. As Nilüfer Göle succinctly 
observes ―many will say that they are not against grandmother‘s headscarf, that on the 
contrary they remember it with affection and respect. This is certainly true to the extent 
that ―grandmothers‖ either sat in their corners at home and didn‘t step into the sites of 
modernity or took of their headscarves as they walked out from indoors. Such behavior 
is in conformity with the scenario of national progress and emancipation of women, key 
elements of modern social imaginary‖ (2002, 181).  
 Stepping into the sites of modernity damages the boundaries of distinction elites 
construct themselves upon; it disturbs the sense of distances and differences built on the 
possession of cultural and social capital. ―I feel strange -even bad I should say- when I 
see people in complete black veils in Ulus, Etiler, Arnavutköy and Bebek...thinking, 
what are they doing here? Then, they say these people are being paid.. to create this 
feeling in you. They are in fact are not living here but are being told "here is money, 
wear your veil, get on the bus and just wander around in Ulus, Etiler. I do believe it is 
so‖ (İpek-31). Ulus, Etiler, Arnavutköy, Bebek all being expensive and fancy 
neighborhoods are reserved for the visibility of modern, çağdaş, fashionable, elegant, 
                                                          
53
 Başörtüsü siyasi bir simgedir. Din özgürlüğü kapsamında ele alınamaz. Samimiyetine inanmıyorum. 
Bizim Anadolu örtülüdür, biliyorsunuz. Köylere gidin, örtülüdür. Kimsenin o örtü takma biçimine itirazı 
yoktur, biz yadırgamayız. […] Çok derinden, çok laik bir insan olduğum için, laikliğe çok inanan bir 
insan olduğum için ve böyle başörtülerle, dinlerle falan ilgim olmadığı için, ben üniversitelerde başörtülü 
insan görmek istemiyorum 
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stylish and classy outfits representing emancipated, secular and Republican women. In a 
similar vein, Filiz (49) multiplies the sites of distinction.  
―We went to a concert in Nişantasi on Saturday evening. Four women 
completely veiled in black are continously walking around in the concert hall. 
Everybody is sitting down and these women are touring around. None of us is in 
need of touring around. We are in a concert hall. They go from one side of the 
hall to the other. It happened like four times, what does this mean? If you ask 
me, they were given 50TL each just to tour around, this was their mission. Go 
and say ―we are here at the heart of Nisantasi in our black veils‖, tell them ―we 
are also here‖ and let them be irritated. These are exercises of "getting us used 
to", are these girls really like this because of their faith?‖ (Filiz-49).54  
 Concert halls as well as fancy neighborhoods, as sites of representation of 
distinction and taste for the owners of cultural capital, define the boundaries of 
exclusion and inclusion. Islamic outfit is excluded in these sites, Islamic women are not 
recognized. Elite‘s perception of the Islamic attire is an issue of recognition which 
―arises when the ―other‖, perceived as different, becomes closer in proximity- spatially, 
socially and corporeally. Recognition of difference is possible only when one finds 
similitude and commonality with the other‖ (Göle 2002, 186). In the aforementioned 
narratives, İpek and Filiz do not discern the ―concrete other‖ and do not tolerate 
difference as part of a social bond. ―Overpoliticized definitions of identity and 
arguments of conspiracy exclude the possibility of finding semblance and familiarity: 
indeed they reinforce the demoniacal definitions of adversary‖ (ibid).  
                                                          
54 Cumartesi akşamı Nişantaşı'nda bir konsere gittik. Dört tane siyah çarşaflı kız konser başlamadan bir o 
yana gidiyorlar, bir bu yana….. herkes oturuyor salonda, o siyah çarşaflılar biri oradan bağlı, biri buradan 
bağlı, biri buradan bağlı, herkes oturuyor, hiçbirimiz kalkıp tur atma ihtiyacında değiliz. Konser 
salonundayız, bir o yana gidiyorlar, bir bu yana gidiyorlar. Dört kere falan oldu bu, şimdi bu ne? Bence 
bir 50'şer lira aldılar, bu turu atın görevi verildi onlara. Nişantaşı'nın göbeğinde siyah çarşaflarla ―biz 
buradayız‖ yapın ve oradaki kesimler bundan bir rahatsızlık duysun. Alıştırma çalışmaları yani, bu kızlar 
inançlarıyla mı böyleler?  
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I have observed that adversarial definitions of veiled women are much more 
emphasized in the narratives of elite women than elite men. Secular elite women 
perceive veiled woman to be ―subservient to man‖, enslaved to the ―inferior‖ status 
Islam has designated for them. During the foundational years of Turkish Republic, 
veiling was a question of civilization. In the 1940s and 1950s, it was associated with 
rural Turkey and singled out as a matter of underdevelopment, poverty and tradition. In 
the 1980s and 1990s veiling became a matter of public confrontation with the state 
authorities as well as secular segments of society (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008). 
During the same period, as Cihan Aktaş argues veiling had been ―reinvented‖ as the 
mark of urban, modern, well educated identity of the Islamist activist women and 
became an inevitable sign of Islamic revivalism (2006).   
―Their [veiled women] core values, way of life and view of life are not the same 
with me. I do not want to live religion in such an obsessed way. For me, religion 
is not just about formalities [such as veiling]. I cannot accept people who live it 
like that. I cannot imagine women who are like that can have an open mind 
"about anything". How can one be such closed-minded, formal about one thing 
and be open minded in another? I cannot comprehend this. This has nothing to 
do with faith. Then, what does woman believe in? Does she believe that she is an 
element of seduction? She is a a creature that seduces man? Does she cover 
herself up because of this? Is this her belief? If a man sees the strings of her hair, 
he would not be able to function? Is this her belief? Freedom of belief… 
Freedom for this? What do we define freedom for? I do not understand, what is 
freedom of belief? This irritates me, this irritates me a lot. I pity them. I am a 
woman. The man next to me will do whatever he wants and me, as a woman, 
will cover myself with those ugly, unaesthetic clothes. How can you force 
women to something like this? How can this be possibly anything to do with 
Allah? When I see these people on the Bosphorus, Bebek or Arnavutköy, I just 
want to ask them "My dear beloved sister, daughter, why are you condemning 
yourself like this? Isn't it a pity?‖55 (İpek-31) 
                                                          
55 Alt yapı, yaşayış, hayata bakışları benimle aynı değil.  Ben dini bu kadar takıntılı bir durumun 
hakimeyeti altında yaşamak istemiyorum. Benim için din şekilden ibaret değil. Böyle yaşayan insanları 
kabul edemiyorum. Böyle düşünen kadınların açık fikirli olabileceğini -herhangi konuda- tasavvur 
edemiyorum. Bu kadar şekilci, bu kadar kapalı düşünebilen, başka konuda nasıl çok açık fikirli olabilir, 
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This furious narrative of İpek allows us to analyze the question of veiling in the realm 
of habitus, cultural codes and life-styles. İpek‘s anger towards veiled women is not 
really about subservience to men, inferiority of women or individual choices, not at all 
about fashion or trends but an indicator of much more complex relations of distinctions, 
stratification, and power.  Veiling has become the sign of a different modernity. It has a 
symbolic power that turns veil in to a symbol of high class to rejuggle the available 
symbols of class and distinction (Navaro-Yashin 2002). It has become a significant 
marker of difference and becomes legitimate as veiled women start occupying the same 
space of positions the elites occupy. All symbolic forms function to generate social 
distinction, veiling, as a symbolic form has started to generate its own distinction as 
veiled women started acquiring cultural capital. This is why Gülsen in the 
aforementioned narrative argues that she does not want to see veiled women in 
universities. Veiled women began to obtain the same cultural capital in the same 
universities that the elites do, they have become visible and recognizable carving out 
their own counter-elite positions. As Ahmet İnsel argues ―the instinctive reactions and 
fears of the laicist elite […] have their source mainly in the anxiety of losing a 
hegemonic position‖ (2003, 299).    
                                                                                                                                                                          
anlayamıyorum. Bunun dini inançla çok bir alakası yok. O zaman kadın neye inanıyor? Kadın bir tahrik 
unsuru olduğuna mı inanıyor? İnsanları tahrik eden bir varlık olduğuna mı inanıyor? Buna inandığı için 
mi kapanıyor? Bu kadının inancı bu mudur? Benim saçımın bilmem ne teli görünürse, adam işini 
yapamaz hale gelecek, beni görecek bir hal olacak adama… Buna inandığı için… Bu mu yani inanç? 
İnanç özgürlüğü…. Buna mı özgürlük? Neye özgürlük tanıyoruz? Anlamıyorum, nedir inanç özgürlüğü? 
Beni rahatsız ediyor, beni çok rahatsız ediyor. Acıyorum onlara.  Ben bir kadınım, yanımdaki adam 
istediği  gibi hareket edebilecek ama ben bir kadın olarak o çirkin, estetik hiçbir tarafı olmayan örtülerle 
kapanacağım. Ben kadın olarak neden çirkinleştirileyim? Niye çirkin olmaya mahkum olayım? Benim bir 
yüzüm var, Allah beni böyle yaratmış, anlayamıyorum. Nasıl kadınları böyle birşeye mahkum 
edebilirsin? Bunun Allah'la ne alakası olabilir? Bu insanları Boğaz'da, Bebek'te ve Arnavutköy'de 
gördüğüm zaman, içimden şöyle yapmak geliyor bazen: ―canım kardeşim, kızım neden kendini buna 
mahkum ediyorsun? Yazık değil mi?‖ 
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 Veiled woman does not represent conservative and religious women but a 
conservative-religious modernity (Aslan 2009) which has created new hybridizations 
between tradition and modernity, religion and secularism, community and religion 
(Göle 1997).  Viewed from a Bourdieusian framework, this means that lifestyles are 
caught up in a social struggle; a struggle for ―distinction‖. The educated (elites) are 
powerful in virtue of the official legitimacy of their (educated) culture and they use their 
power to maintain its legitimacy. Veiled women, on the other hand, are trying to 
develop cultural peculiarities which mark them out from the others. They strive to have 
a distinct culture –hence distinction. These differences, in the case of the headscarf 
controversy in Turkey, has become a focus of symbolic struggles (struggles for 
distinction) in which members of each group seek to (re)establish both the superiority of 
their peculiarities and an official sanction for them. These symbolic powers struggle to 
have control over the knowledge that is valued, sanctioned and rewarded within the 
education system in particular and society in general.        
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 This study was inspired by my own experiences and observations of power 
relations in Turkey. In many aspects, it is a self-study; an attempt to question the world 
around me. It is an endeavor to come into terms with myself; an effort to understand my 
distances and differences. In this respect, I am grateful to all the people I have 
interviewed. Some were my friends, some became my friends after hours of sharing. At 
the end of my interview with Gülsen, as I was packing my stuff, she paused for a minute 
and said ―I wish I could interview you, I am really curious about your views on the 
questions you asked me, I couldn‘t decide what you may be thinking about all these 
issues we have discussed.‖ Gülsen had openly shared her views with me feeling that we 
had a shared habitus. Similarly, another friend of mine told me to be cautious about the 
impacts of this study among the group of people I have interviewed. He thought that 
―we‖ were not accustomed to being mirrored by ―one of our own‖. However, I believe 
that it is necessary that we restore to ourselves the meaning of our actions, the positions 
we take and the feelings we generate. This is simply what I have tried to do in this 
research.  
 In order to understand how Turkish elites socially, politically and culturally 
position themselves in contemporary Turkey, I have interviewed 19 graduates of Robert 
College and Üsküdar American Academy. I argued that schooling plays a significant 
role in the reproduction of the elite. Basing my arguments on the reproduction theory of 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, I tried to show that educational system has a strong 
tendency to reproduce the existing social order which clearly demarcates the line 
between the dominant and the dominated.  Schooling, in the world and in Turkey, 
increasingly appears to be an important field of social distinction.  
88 
 
 In order to understand how social distinctions are generated, enhanced and 
legitimated I defined and used some of the concepts of Bourdieu, which are habitus, 
cultural capital and symbolic capital. Bourdieu‘s theorizing of power relations has 
mostly shaped the discussions of this study. I inquired into the symbolic power of 
Ataturkism and tried to show how Ataturkism orders social life in binary oppositions 
with its own language, and argue that it performs as an instrument of knowledge and 
communication in defying other knowledges that seek ground for communication.  
 A way to defy, or shadow, or marginalize other knowledges is to ignore them. 
Through an inquiry into an epistemology of ignorance, I argued that educated and 
willful ignorance is not a simple lack, a gap or an omission or a consequence of the 
limitedness of human knowledge, but it is intentional not knowing. I questioned how 
elite privilege is constituted and/or sustained through an epistemology of ignorance. I 
tried to trace ignorance in the two socially and politically significant issues of 
contemporary Turkey; the Kurdish and Armenian questions. I argued that willful 
ignorance is an active production that engenders the otherization practices and is rooted 
in what Adorno calls half-education. The idealization of education for a better future –a 
theme that I have discussed by referring to the immense efforts to acquire cultural 
capital- has turned education to an instrument which is used to facilitate integration of 
the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity 
not autonomy.  
 Under what circumstances the conformity of the elite is challenged in Turkey? I 
tried to explore the conflict between secularism and Islamism through the feelings elites 
associate with the present day status of secularism in Turkey. I analyzed discourses of 
danger that construe Islamism and Islamists as the major threat to the republican value 
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of secularism. I argued that the construction of the secular elite identity is both inspired 
and supported by Ataturkist nationalism and tried to show the clash of secular and 
Islamist identities through the prism of the headscarf debate in contemporary Turkey. 
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
NAME AGE SCHOOL OCCUPATION 
Silva 71 RC Retired 
Gülsen 69 UAA Businesswoman 
Özkan 69 RC Law professor 
Ahmet 66 RC Businessman 
Seher 60 UAA Philanthropist 
Dilek 60 IAA Education specialist 
Serap 58 UAA Education specialist 
Filiz 49 RC Student 
Selim 49 RC Banker 
Nazan 37 UAA Manager 
İdil  37 UAA Economist 
Murat 36 RC Doctor 
Sarp 35 RC Physicist/Computer Engineer 
İpek 31 RC Lawyer 
Melike 30 RC Managing Director 
Sevim 28 UAA Contracts Administrator 
Bora 25 RC Engineer 
Esra 25 RC Lawyer 
Defne 25 RC Visual Designer 
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